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ABSTRACT
Albanian -  American Relations 
The Past and The Future
by
V ladim ir Cicani
Dr. A. C. Tuttle, Exam ination Com m ittee Chair 
Emeritus Professor o f  Political Science 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis presents a political and historical analysis o f  the evolution o f  American -  
Albanian relations since their initiation up to the present.
The study focuses on the highlights o f  these relations such as the role o f  the United 
States (U.S.) in the preservation o f  A lbania’s territorial sovereignty right after the First 
W orld W ar, the decisive support o f  the United States for the dem ocratization processes in 
Albania, as well as the dynamics o f  Am erican-Albanian relations during the  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in K osova (Serbian language, 
Kosovo). This study will analyze the im portance and the role o f  Albania in the present 
strategy o f  the United States in the Balkans, as well as the m ain factors that will 
determ ine the future course o f  the relations between the tw o countries.
This research constitutes the first concise study dedicated exclusively to 
Albanian-Am erican relations, especially for the period after the fall o f  com m unism .
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
American-Albanian relations have rarely made headlines. A lbania, a tiny isolated 
country in the far-away Balkans, has not occupied a significant position in the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda. This is understandable if  we take into account a num ber o f  factors.
First, there exists a huge difference in the territory, population and the economic and 
m ilitary potential o f  the United States and Albania that has determ ined their respective 
positions in the international hierarchy. The United States enjoys the status o f  a 
superpow er, whereas Albania has hardly ever been regarded as a regional power in the 
Balkans.
Second, due to the late formation o f  the Albanian state, a long established tradition o f  
bilateral relations does not exist. A lbania was the last European nation to win 
independence from the Ottom an Em pire in 1912. By comparison, G reece won it back in 
1821. It also took several more years for Albania to achieve nationhood and international 
recognition.
Third, Albania, unlike other com m unist countries, was ruled until the fall o f  
com m unism , by a Stalinist dictatorship, which virtually isolated the country from the 
outside world, including the United States. In fact, Albania was the only  communist 
country in Eastern Europe that did not have diplomatic relations with the United States 
during the entire period o f  com m unist rule.
1
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These three factors have greatly influenced w hat appear to be a low profile o f  
Am erican-Albanian relations and the seeming lack o f  U.S. interest in .Albania. However, 
it should be stressed that, despite a long gap and ups and downs in the bilateral relations. 
Am erican diplomacy, on more than one occasion, has been preoccupied with .Albania and 
the Albanian question. In fact, there are a num ber o f  cases when Albania has been high 
on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
The first occasion was during the Versailles Conference in Paris in 1919 w here the 
borders o f  a new Europe were decided after W orld W ar I. President Wilson and the 
Am erican delegation in this conference were seriously involved in the A lbanian question 
and the future o f  the Albanian state. They strongly defended the existence o f  an 
independent Albanian state, thus preventing the d ivision o f  Albania among neighboring 
countries that had expansionist ambitions toward Albania.
The second major engagement o f  American diplom acy with Albania was in the late 
1940s after the establishment o f the comm unist regim e and the failure o f  attem pts to 
resum e diplomatic relations. With the beginning o f  the Cold W ar, the United States, 
together with Britain, chose Albania, which was considered the weakest spot in the 
com m unist chain, as an experiment to test the possibilities o f  destabilizing new 
com m unist regimes in Eastern Europe by organizing internal uprisings. In the case o f  
A lbania this experiment failed, leading to a radical change o f  U.S. strategy tow ards 
Com m unist countries.
The third important moment in A lbanian-Am erican relations was during the recent 
Kosova conflict in 1999 when Albania played a m ajor role in the U.S.-led NA TO
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involvem ent in this conflict. This resu lted  in the strengthening o f  overall bilateral 
relations.
This thesis w ill focus on the dynam ics o f  the relations betw een the United States and 
Albania, especially since the fall o f  com m unism  in that country in 1991. This study will 
analyze the main historic m oments and directions o f  U.S. policy tow ards A lbania as well 
as U.S. aims and interests in Albania.
The main research questions are: w hat is the role and place o f  A lbania in U.S. foreign 
policy in the Balkans? How strong are the  bilateral relations? W hat is the attitude o f  the 
Albanian political establishment and the A lbanian people toward the United States? W hat 
can be the future developm ents o f  bilateral relations?
M y hypothesis is that Albania, for a variety  o f  reasons, represents both an asset and a 
problem  for Am erican policy and in terests in the Balkans, and that, given the present 
trends and instabilities in the region, as w ell as the unpredictable future o f  Kosova, 
A lbania and the A lbanian question w ill preoccupy American diplom acy for a long period 
o f  tim e, thereby keeping the United S tates actively  engaged in Balkan affairs. This m ay 
result in the further strengthening o f  U .S .-A lbanian bilateral relations and the increase o f  
the role and im portance o f  Albania in U .S. Balkan strategy.
In presenting m y findings, I have tried  to com bine historical facts and developm ents 
with an analysis o f  present-day events and phenom ena.
M y theoretical approach is based on  the realist theor\' o f  international relations, which 
views states as the m ain actors and self-in terest as the main m otive o f  state actions and 
behavior. According to Hans M orgenthau, one o f  the main proponents o f  realism , 
national self-interest and the survival o f  the  regim es and states is the basic tenet o f  realist
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4theory. Hence, m ilitary and security matters top the list o f  nation’s priorities and 
dom inate the agenda o f  international relations. It is for this reason that realist theory , with 
its em phasis on national interest and state surv ival, is the best guide in helping to explain 
the actions o f  the United States and Albania in their bilateral relations and their 
interactions with other actors.
For this thesis, I have made use o f such U.S. archives as the Foreign Policy Volum es. 
Press Statem ents and Country Reports o f the State Departm ent, the Presidential W eekly 
Reports, and the docum ents o f  the Library o f  the Congress. I have also used various press 
reports and official docum ents and statements o f  the A lbanian government and political 
parties, as well as num erous publications and interviews by experts and politicians who 
have been responsible for the region.
This thesis constitutes the first concise study dedicated exclusively to Albanian- 
Am erican relations, covering their evolution from the beginning to the present. M uch o f  
the m aterial, taken from the U.S. archives, is published for the first tim e in a scholarly 
publication.
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CH.APTER 2 
THE PAST
1. The Early Connections -  An Am erican 
M andate over Albania?
The earliest Am erican-Albanian contacts can be traced to the arrival o f  the first wave 
o f immigrants to the United States during the last half o f  the 19'^ century. These 
immigrants settled mainly along the east coast, and formed a num ber o f  cultural and 
social organizations, which issued various publications. A lthough small in number, 
compared with o ther nationalities, the Albanian immigrants and their organizations 
played an im portant role in inform ing the American public on the dire situation in 
Albania, thus increasing the sym pathy o f  the American people and that o f  official circles 
on the plight o f  the Albanian people. At the same time, through their contacts with the 
homeland, these im m igrants m ade known to the Albanian public the American reality as 
well as Am erican politics and ideals. With the passing o f  time, the Albanian people began 
to nourish strong feelings o f  attachm ent and friendship for the Am erican people and their 
government. The Albanians in general, and the Albanian com m unity in the United States 
in particular, placed high hopes in the suppon and protection o f  the United States for their 
small and newly independent country, w hich was constantly confronted with various 
threats by its bigger neighbors. Traditionally, in times o f  crisis and need, the .Albanians
Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6would look upon the United States for assistance and protection. This was best reflected 
in a popular song o f  the tim e which says; “ Mother, d o n 't be afraid because your sons are 
in the United States.”
These sentiments were strongly m anifested especially after the proclam ation o f 
.Albania’s independence in 1912. This w as not well received by neighboring states.
Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, which all had annexationist ambitions toward Albania.
At that time, Europe was dom inated by six Great powers: Austria-Hungary, Great 
Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Russia, which considered small nations as bargaining 
objects in their rivalry for spheres o f  influence. These powers did not recognize the 
independence o f  A lbania in 1912, which, for them, had to function as a small 
“autonomous principality” under the rule o f  a foreign prince and an International Control 
Commission. The result o f  this policy was that more than h a lf  o f  the Albanian nation and 
territory was detached from the hom eland, including the province o f  Kosova, which was 
rich in mineral resources.
The position o f  Albania as an independent state was further complicated after the 
outbreak o f  the First W orld W ar when neighboring countries invaded Albanian territory. 
Under these conditions, the Albanians, living inside and outside the country, were very 
m uch worried about the survival o f  A lbania as an independent state. They feared that in 
the political settlem ents after the end o f  the war, Albania m ight cease to be a sovereign 
country. In fact, these fears were not baseless. Immediately after the outbreak o f  World 
W ar 1. on 20 April 1915, Britain. France, Italy, and Russia signed a secret agreement, 
known as the Treaty o f  London, w hich am ounted to the virtual partition o f  Albania 
am ong Italy. Greece, and Serbia. A lthough this treaty was kept secret until its publication
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/in 1917 by  a Soviet newspaper, news o f  a possible partition circulated am ong Albanian 
im m igrants in the United States and other countries. It was precisely at these difficult 
m om ents that Albanians began to look increasingly upon the United States as their savior 
and pro tector, because they considered the United States as the only m ajor pow er with no 
selfish am bitions toward Albania. Fan Noli, B ishop o f  the Albanian O rthodox church in 
the U nited  States, in a letter sent to the Secretary o f  State, Robert Lansing, appealed to 
President W ilson on behalf o f  all Am ericans in the United States “to use his moral 
influence to prevent partition o f  A lbania.” '
It w as at this tim e that the idea o f  an A m erican m andate over Albania began to take 
root am ong Albanians. A statement issued on 15 M arch 1918 by “Vatra." the largest 
A lbanian-A m erican organization, noted that it is “the unanim ous wish o f  all .Albanians 
that w hen their independence is restored, there shall be assigned to them the assistance 
and cooperation  o f  som e great nation with no am bition to subserve and no desire for 
territorial conquest,” and that “the United States seem s to be the one nation to which the 
A lbanians can look with perfect confidence.”'  This idea took an official tone with the 
opening o f  the Paris Peace Conference where the A lbanian delegation presented, on 7 
March 1919, an official request that the Conference assign to the United States a mandate 
over Albania.^
It m ust be stressed that the idea o f  a U.S. m andate over Albania was not solely a 
desire o r project that originated from the Albanian side. A num ber o f  high-ranking 
officials at the State Department were also seriously contem plating this idea. Thus in a 
confidential docum ent that circulated within the U.S. Department o f  State in Novem ber 
1918 under the title “ B rief Recom m endations Regarding Albania,” it was suggested that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
s
the U.S. government m ight support “the assignment o f  this territory to a m andatory 
which must be a great pow er which should be disinterested.'*^ The document 
acknowledged that the U nited States appeared to be the on ly  pow er satisfying the above 
requirement and for this, it m ight accept the m andate. At that tim e, the State Department 
sent a number o f  em issaries to Albania in order to see to w hat extent this idea was 
practical and what support it had among the people. Joseph Have, the Am erican Consul 
in Turin, after a special tour o f  Albania, stressed in his report that “the first choice and the 
universal demand throughout all Albania, without exception, is for American 
administrative control.” '  Another Am erican emissary, R obert Ham m ond, U.S. Vice- 
Consul in Rome, visited A lbania one year later and reached the sam e conclusion. “The 
Albanians as a w hole,” he wrote, “w orship and love the U nited States and American 
ideals to a fanatical degree,” adding that, “they want an A m erican mandate over them .”^
It m ust be stressed that som e members o f  the Am erican delegation  at the Paris Peace 
Conference supported the idea that the United States should accept a form o f  mandate 
over Albania. In a M emo written by a member o f  the delegation, dated 23 March 1919, it 
is argued that “Am erica has no political ambitions on this part o f  the world,” and that, “a 
status and the presence o f  Am erica in Albania would have positive  repercussions 
throughout the Balkans.”
Although the idea o f  a U.S. m andate over Albania found supporters in American 
diplomatic circles, and. for a time, was seriously discussed, it never materialized as an 
official U.S. policy. Two factors might have played a role in the outcome. First, at this 
time the United States, w hich was not yet a European pow er, w as concerned that the big 
European powers would not allow W ashington to establish a sphere o f  influence in
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9Europe's backyard, the Balkans. This is one reason w hy W ilson shifted toward favoring 
an Italian m andate over Albania. Second, as the First W orld W ar cam e to an end. a strong 
tendency toward isolationism  reemerged in W ashington and quickly becam e official U.S. 
policy with the refusal o f  the Senate to jo in  the League o f  Nations.
It m ust be stressed that the very discussion o f  the idea o f  a U.S. m andate over 
Albania, despite not m aterializing, played an im portant role in bilateral relations, and 
future U.S. policies toward Albania. First, it dem onstrated the strong pro-American 
feelings and sentim ents o f  the Albanian population, a tradition that has lasted up to the 
present. Second, this discussion greatly influenced the stand o f  President Wilson and the 
American delegation toward the Albanian question when it was discussed at the Paris 
Conference, which was called to settle the post-W ar boundaries.
2. President W ilson and A lbania’s Sovereignty 
The entrance o f  the United States in the First W orld W ar in March 1917. and the 
proclamation by President W ilson o f  the Fourteen Points Program as the basis for the 
future world order, aroused great hopes among the small nations o f  Europe, which 
counted on Am erican help for a ju st solution o f  their problems and the achievement o f  
nationhood. In particular, Albania, which was the sm allest and weakest nation in Europe, 
had pinned great hopes on the support o f  America w hen the problem o f  A lbania’s 
independence was discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. The A lbanian newspaper.
“The Adriatic Review ,” wrote at that time “ in the list o f  A lbania’s friends are included 
two o f  the illum inated people o f  Am erica and the world. President W ilson and former
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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President Roosevelt."*' The reference to Roosevelt was because the form er President had 
publicly expressed his opposition to an Italian protectorate over Albania.
At the close o f  the First W orld W ar. A lbania found itself in a very precarious 
situation. The neighboring countries o f  Serbia, Greece, Italy, and M ontenegro, whose 
arm ies had occupied Albania during the war, had come to the Paris Peace Conference 
with the aim o f securing the greatest part o f  the Albanian territory. Sensing the 
com plexity o f  the Albanian question, with the initiative o f  the A m erican delegation, the 
representatives o f the United States, France and Great Britain signed, on 9 December 
1919. a memorandum, which expressed the desire o f  the signatory states to recognize the 
territorial unity o f  Albania. H ow ever, they considered that the new  independent Albanian 
state would require the adm inistrative advice and assistance o f  one o f  the great powers, 
and thus entrusted Italy with a m andate over Albania. Although this decision did not fully 
satisfy the aspirations o f  the A lbanian people for a fully independent state, it avoided the 
greatest danger for a possible partition o f  the country among its neighboring countries.
It is for this reason that these countries expressed dissatisfaction with the above 
decision and began to put pressure on the big powers for adding am endm ents that would 
grant them  certain rights over A lbanian territories. As a result, on 14 January 920, the 
Prime M inisters o f  France and Britain, Georges Clemenceau and D avid Lloyd George, in 
the absence o f  the American representative, issued an amended declaration, agreeing that 
northern Albania, including the city  o f  Shkodra, should be ceded to neighboring 
Y ugoslavia while the Korea district in the south should go to Greece. This decision 
am ounted to a near total partition o f  A lbania am ong Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia, 
leaving only a dysfunctional small territory that represented some 30 percent o f  the
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original territory. Upon hearing about this decision, on 9 February 1920. President 
W ilson sent a strongly worded note to London and Paris, com plaining that the January 
M emorandum had been “negotiated without the knowledge o r approval o f  the American 
governm ent" and that it “partitions the A lbanian people, against their vehem ent protests, 
am ong three different alien pow ers."’’ In another telegram sent, on 24 February 1920. to 
the American am bassador in Paris, Wilson stressed that the U.S. governm ent was 
“vigorously opposed to injuring the Albanian people for the benefit o f  Y ugoslavia.""’ In a 
third telegram sent to the Am erican am bassador in Paris, on 4 M arch 1920, W ilson 
insisted that “the Albanian questions should not be included in the proposed jo in t 
discussion o f  Italy and Yugoslavia" and that he “cannot approve any plan w hich assigns 
to Y ugoslavia in the northern districts o f  A lbania territorial com pensation for w hat she is 
deprived o f  elsewhere.” "  According to a State Department official, “nothing else irritated 
W ilson m ore than the unjust attem pt to annex Albanian territories.” '*
Due to Am erican insistence, France and Britain withdrew their agreem ent o f  14 
January, and the solution o f  the Albanian question was postponed and referred to the 
Conference o f Am bassadors, which, in 1921 reaffirmed the 1913 boundaries, thus 
averting any further partition. This decision was o f  historic im portance for the future 
existence o f  the A lbanian state. As the British analyst M iranda Vickers points out, having 
in mind the weak position o f  Albania, the unfriendly stand o f  the m ajor European powers, 
and the ambitions o f  the more powerful neighboring states, “the fact that Albania 
emerged at all as an independent state in 1920 was indeed rem arkab le ." ''
There were a num ber o f  reasons for President W ilson 's stand in favor o f  A lbania’s 
independence. First, there was the m oral imperative o f  self-determ ination for small
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nations that formed the backbone o f  W ilson’s 14-point declaration. Second. American 
diplom acy at that tim e was against the dom ination o f  any big or regional power in the 
Balkans. Third, W ashington considered the existence o f  an independent Albanian state as 
a positive factor o f  stability in the Balkans. President W ilson and his s taff were 
convinced that any partition o f  A lbania w ould lead to instability and problem s in the 
region that already had been the origin o f  the First World War. Thus. Colonel Sherman 
M iles, an Am erican em issary in Albania, w rote in a M ay 1919 letter sent to the 
International Com m ission on the Balkans that “the drawing o f  a ju st national boundary 
betw een M ontenegro and Albania as well as betw een Albania and the other states, 
bordering on it, is a prim e necessity for the future peace o f  the Balkans. ”'^
It m ay be said that the Paris Peace Conference m arked the first serious involvement 
o f  A m erican diplom acy with the Albanian question that it would confront again at 
various stages in the future. In fact, the preservation o f  an independent Albanian state and 
its territorial integrity, as m anifested at the Paris Conference, would be a permanent 
feature o f  official Am erican policy in the Balkans, a stand that at crucial moments o f  
history has been decisive for the future o f  Albania.
3. The Rule o f  King Zog I and American 
Interests in Albania (1925-1939)
T he United States officially recognized the new Albanian state on 28 July 1922, and 
in Septem ber o f  that year, the first U.S. M inister. Ulysses Grant Sm ith, arrived in Tirana 
to open the new legation. At that tim e Albania was going through a period o f  internal 
instability that was m arked by frequent changes o f  governm ents and political quarrels.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The American recognition was o f  great importance for the international status o f  Albania 
and the future o f  bilateral relations.
This act demonstrated that, despite the departure o f  W ilson, strong feelings o f  
sym pathy and admiration for the A lbanian nation still existed in the official circles o f 
W ashington. On the o ther hand, the presence o f  an increasing num ber o f  Albanian 
imm igrants in the United States was becom ing an important factor in influencing the 
Am erican policy towards Albania. In fact, by this time U.S. diplom acy was trying to play 
a more active role in Balkan affairs, w here Albania offered new challenges. Although 
small in population and territory, the country was rich in strategic m inerals, representing 
som e attractive opportunities for foreign companies. Thus, in M arch 1922, Charles 
Erickson, an American m issionary w ho had been in Albania for m any years and who at 
that tim e was acting as the representative o f  the Standard Oil Com pany, informed the 
State Department that “ Am erican capital could be very profitably and safely invested in 
Albania, but for this it m ust have the good will o f  the governm ent, som ething that can 
only be established by diplom atic recognition.” ' ’ Following various recom mendations, 
on 22 June 922, one m onth before the official recognition, an official U.S. Commissioner. 
M axwell Blake, was sent to Albania w here he got assurances that Am erican interests 
would receive most favored treatm ent in return for diplomatic recognition.
The establishment o f  diplom atic relations in July 1922 opened the w ay for a number 
o f  economic and political agreem ents betw een the two countries. The 1920s were 
characterized by a period o f  intense rivalry between the big European powers for political 
influence and economic concessions from the Albanian governm ents. Under these 
circum stances, the United States dem onstrated in various diplom atic moves its
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preoccupation and interest in preserv ing the independence o f  Albania. At that tim e. 
W ashington rejected the establishm ent o f  any foreign monopoly over A lban ia 's  politics 
and economy, som ething that the United States continued to consider very dangerous for 
the future o f  A lbania’s independence. It is for this reason that W ashington did not 
recognize the new governm ent o f  Fan Noli, which cam e to power in June 1924 as a result 
o f  an uprising against the existing governm ent o f  Ahmet Zogu. .Along with the United 
S tates’supicion o f  the tendency o f  the Noli governm ent to establish close links with the 
Soviet Union, W ashington also feared its favorable stand towards a Balkan federation, 
which at that tim e was considered detrim ental to U.S. interests in the Balkans. Proceeding 
from this stand, the United States welcom ed the return to power o f  Ahmet Zogu in 
December 1924, extending im m ediate recognition to the new government. A lthough 
W ashington considered Zogu an authoritarian figure, the United States thought that his 
regime would better serve the stability o f  Albania and American interests in the region. 
During this period a num ber o f  im portant agreements in trade and education w ere 
reached between the two countries. Am erican institutions and scholars contributed to the 
drafting o f  the new  Constitution and the setting up o f  a modem Albanian state, based on 
law and order. A t the beginning o f  1926, the United States granted the accreditation o f  
the first Albanian am bassador in W ashington, Faik Konica, who would rem ain in this 
post until A lbania was occupied by Italy in 1939.
In Septem ber 1928, President Ahm et Zogu, through an act o f  parliament, 
changed the form o f  regim e, proclaim ing Albania a monarchy and him self Zog 
I. King o f  Albanians. It is interesting to note that the United States, which 
traditionally favors parliam entary regim es, was am ong the first Great Powers,
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after Italy, to recognize the change o f  regim e and Zog as King o f  Albania.
President Calvin Coolidge sent a personal telegram  o f  congratulations to Zog on 
his accession to the throne, expressing his desire for the further strengthening o f  
the bilateral relations."’
There were a number o f  reasons for this sw ift recognition on the part o f  the United 
States. First, w ith this act, W ashington wanted to confirm  its preference and support for 
continuity  in Albania, trying to prevent any possible turbulence in the country that might 
follow the change in the form o f  regim e. At that time, Am erican diplom acy had come to 
the conclusion that m onarchy was an elem ent o f  stability for Albania and that a stable 
Albania would better serve American interests in the region. Seen in a broader context, 
this diplom atic move expressed a new interest on the part o f  W ashington in an area 
traditionally considered a European sphere o f  influence.
Am erican recognition was a great boost for the new Albanian m onarchy and its 
position in the international arena. The first years o f  the m onarchy witnessed a new 
im petus in the bilateral relations. During this period, the two countries signed a number 
o f  treaties and conventions, while Am erican com panies w on a number o f  concessions in 
the oil industry. The Albanian exports to the United States increased from 4.5%  o f  the 
total in 1927 to 17.1% in 1930, while the im port o f  U.S. goods in Albania increased from 
1.6% in 1923 to 7.2% in 1930.''
How ever, w ith the passing o f  time it becam e clear that the new Albanian m onarchy 
was com ing m ore and m ore under the dom ination o f  Italy, which traditionally had 
regarded A lbania as its legitimate sphere o f  influence. A lthough King Zog took some 
m easures to diversify foreign relations, he was unable to escape the Italian yoke, and at
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
tim es o f  difficulties, tended to give economic and political concessions to Italy. With the 
increasing Italian dom ination o f  Albania during the last years o f  the Zog regime. 
Am erican influence in the country began to dwindle. The failure to rely on American 
support to confront Italian dom ination m ight be considered as one o f  the m ajor 
diplom atic m istakes o f  King Zog. .Although on several occasions the United States had 
voiced its dissatisfaction with King Z og ’s concessions to Italy, W ashington was not 
inclined to openly confront Italy over Albania.
It m ust be noted that the United States was the only big power to publicly protest 
against the Italian invasion o f  Albania on 7 April 1939. A day later. Secretary o f  State 
Cordell Hull issued a statement where he strongly condemned the act as “a forcible and 
violent invasion, which constitutes unquestionably an additional threat to the peace o f  the 
w orld.” '* President Roosevelt h im self m ade a personal appeal to Italy denouncing the 
A lbanian occupation. The United States never recognized the annexation o f  Albania by 
Italy because this act violated international law as well as the m ain objective o f  Am erican 
policy toward Albania, that is, the preservation o f  the independence o f  the country. At the 
beginning o f  June 1939, when the armexation was formalized w ith the Treaty o f  Union 
and the abolition o f  A lbania’s Foreign M inistry, the U.S. representative in Albania, Hugh 
G rant, was immediately instructed by the State Department to close the U.S. M ission in 
T irana and return with his staff. This Am erican stand was in contrast to that o f Great 
Britain, which kept a representative in Albania until June 1941 when Italy declared war 
on Britain.
The withdrawal o f  the American m ission from Albania in June 1939 was the start o f  a 
long gap in the formal diplom atic relations. This gap would close 52 years later with the
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reestablishm ent o f  diplomatie relations in 1991. following the fall o f  the com m unist 
regime.
4. The Diplom atic Recognition that 
N ever Materialized
During the Second World War, A lbania was first occupied by Italy in 1939 and then 
by G erm any in 1943 after the capitulation o f  Rome. A num ber o f groups form ed in the 
country w ith the aim o f  organizing arm ed resistance against foreign occupiers. The 
largest and better-organized form ation w as the National Liberation Front, w hich was led 
by the com m unists. Albania was the only  country in Europe, which was liberated without 
the presence o f  allied troops in its territory.
During the w ar years, the United States was not actively involved in the various 
resistance groups that operated in A lbania. This was in accordance with U .S. policy at 
that time, which considered the Balkans as a British sphere o f  activity. H ow ever, it 
should be noted that among the Allies, the United States was the first country  to 
recognize the resistance movement o f  the Albanian people. On 10 D ecem ber 1942, 
Secretary o f  State Cordell Hull issued a statem ent stressing that the governm ent o f  the 
United States “is not unmindful o f  the continued resistance o f  the A lbanian people to the 
Italian forces o f  occupation. The effort o f  the various guerilla bands operating  against the 
common enem y in Albania is admired and appreciated. The Governm ent and people o f  
the United States, the statement went on, look forward to the day when effective military 
assistance can be given to these brave m en to drive the invader from their hom es.” ' * This 
statement reaffirm ed the main objective o f  U.S. policy towards Albania, that is, support 
for the restoration o f  a free and independent Albania.
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This American stand, while boosting the resistance movement in .Albania, drew 
protests from Athens. In fact, A thens had asked the American government to m ake some 
confidential communications to the G reek governm ent on the question o f  Northern 
Epirus, the Greek name for the Southern part o f  .Albania, which was claim ed by .Athens 
as G reek territory. The United States, desp ite  the strong influence o f  the G reek lobby, 
categorically refused to com m it itse lf to such an idea. In December 1942, during a 
m eeting with the Greek Am bassador in W ashington, U.S. Under Secretary o f  State, 
W elles, m ade it clear that the U.S. governm ent “would not be willing to m ake any secret 
com m itm ents with regard to territorial changes to any another country.’’*^’
It m ust be stressed that even before the end o f  the war, the U.S. began to think 
seriously about the Albanian question and the future role o f  the Albanian state within the 
Balkan context. The old idea o f  a possib le Am erican mandate over Albania began to 
circulate again among U.S. diplom atic circles in W ashington. Thus, in a State 
Departm ent Memorandum dated O ctober 1943 and entitled “The Albanian Problem ,” 
W ashington expressed its concern about the future stability o f Albania and suggested the 
necessity for foreign control and authority. W hile affirm ing “only the United States 
would be wholly satisfactory to the A lbanians,” the memorandum recom m ended as the 
best solution the establishment o f  “ an international control in which the United States 
would play  a prominent or a leading ro le.”"' By this time, it seems that the U.S. was 
concerned that the Albanian state that w ould em erge from the war would be too fragile to 
stand on its own feet and that the country m ight be dependent or controlled by another 
bigger power, namely Yugoslavia o r the Soviet Union. This concern em erges from 
another docum ent o f  the State Departm ent o f  April 1944 entitled “The Econom ic Basis o f
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A lbania’s Independence.” According to this docum ent, .Albania appeared to be so small 
and  weak econom ically that “it is difficult to see how in the future it could escape 
econom ic vassalage to another power unless it jo ined in a partnership with its stronger 
n e ig h b o r s .T h i s  recom mendation was in line w ith the U.S. policy at that time, which 
favored the creation o f  a Balkan Union, as opposed to Soviet influence in the region.
The liberation o f  Albania in N ovem ber 1944 and the subsequent com ing to power o f  
the com m unists was no great surprise to the United States, w hich together with Britain, 
had tended to render more help to the comm unist-led resistance group in comparison with 
the o ther nationalist formations, which were not so active in the anti-fascist movement. It 
seem s that at that time, the United States was not fully convinced o f  the communist 
credentials o f  the new Albanian leaders, whom it considered patriotic and nationalist 
rather than com m unist. Moreover, as in the case o f  the other East European countries, 
W ashington tried to use the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe and the extension o f  
diplom atic recognition for the new regim e in Albania as a pressure to foster a more 
independent and dem ocratic course. Thus, when the new Albanian government asked 
W ashington for official diplomatic recognition, the U.S. governm ent replied that “it 
needed m ore time to be fully informed regarding the conditions and developm ents in 
A lbania,” asking, at the same time, for permission to send a small informal mission to 
supply  the information which it needed." This request was granted and the American 
m ission arrived in Albania on 8 M ay 1945. At first, the U.S. m ission had a favorable 
evaluation o f  the developm ents in A lbania and the ability o f  the new government to 
control the situation. In particular, the members o f  the mission were impressed with the 
pro-W estern orientation o f  the m ajority o f  the population and reached the conclusion that
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American influence was strong in Albania. In a telegram that the Head o f  the U.S. 
mission, Joseph Jacobs, sent to the Secretary o f  State on 1 July 1945. it was noted “about 
25%  o f  the A lbanian population have either been in the United States or have friends and 
relatives who have been there.” It also noted that several thousand Albanians had been 
educated in A m erican schools in Albania and that “cultural and sentimental ties w ith the 
United States are strong.”'^ After only five m onths o f  observation, the U.S. m ission sent a 
final report to the State Department where in principle it recom mended the sim ultaneous 
recognition o f  the new regime by the three big allies, the United States, Britain and 
Russia, at the earliest possible date.
However, the United States added two conditions to this recognition: a pledge from 
the Albanian authorities to hold free elections for a Constituent Assembly which would 
decide upon the future form o f  government and the confirm ation by Tirana o f  the validity 
o f  the bilateral treaties concluded during the reign o f  King Zog. It is interesting to note 
that at that tim e, the United States still believed that A lbania could follow an independent 
course, since the Soviet Army had not entered the country during the war. In fact, U.S. 
officials had hoped that “ if there is any occupied country where, in accordance w ith the 
Crim ea Declaration, the three great powers m ight collaborate on equal footing, that 
country is A lbania.”"'
The stand o f  American diplom acy towards Albania at that tim e seems to be 
contradictory. By insisting on free election and the validity o f  the former treaties with 
King Zog, the United States hoped to strengthen its presence and influence in A lbania as 
a counterweight to the Soviet penetration. On the other hand, the delay in granting 
diplom atic recognition had the effect o f further driving Albania in the Soviet-Yugoslav
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direction. W hile the United States expressed satisfaction with the conduct o f  the general 
elections in D ecem ber 1945, the question o f  pre-war treaties was never resoh ed, 
becoming an insurm ountable obstacle for the resum ption o f  diplomatic relations.
By the begiiming o f  1946 the United States was convinced that a com m unist regim e 
was established in Albania, w hich was slipping under the patronage o f Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union. A telegram that the Head o f  the American mission in Albania, Jacobs, 
sent on 5 February 1946 to the Secretary o f  State stressed that “Soviet influence here has 
been increased by leaps and bounds” and that “everything the Albanian governm ent is 
doing is directed by a Com m unist pro-Soviet group with, at least, the knowledge and 
consent o f  Soviet authorities and possibly under their direction.”"*’ Confronted w ith  the 
increasing hostility o f  the Albanian governm ent, which had put a num ber o f  restrictions 
on the movements o f  the Am erican mission, as well as the continuous refusal o f  the 
Albanian authorities to recognize the validity o f  the pre-war bilateral treaties, the United 
States finally decided, at the beginning o f  Novem ber 1946, to withdraw its informal 
mission from Albania. In a telegram  that the Acting Secretary o f State, Dean Acheson, 
sent, on 2 N ovem ber 1946, to the U.S. Acting Representative in Albania, Henderson, it is 
stated that there was not “any further reason for the m ission to remain in A lbania” and 
that “the m ission has been unable to achieve the purposes for which it was originally sent 
to A lbania,” that is, the establishm ent o f  diplom atic relations."
Seen in retrospect, it is hard to reach a conclusion as to whether the withdrawal o f  the 
American mission from Albania was the right or the wrong decision at the time. T he fact 
is that the absence o f  diplom atic relations as well as the lack o f  an American 
representation in A lbania greatly weakened the capacity o f  American diplom acy to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
influence the future direction o f  the internal and  external developments o f  A lbania. It had 
also deprived the United States o f  a foothold in a strategic position in the Balkans. A key 
question can be asked in reference to this p rob lem : Having in mind the strong pro- 
A m erican feelings o f  the Albanian population, w ou ld  an American presence have 
influenced the future course o f the country, espec ia lly  after the break with the Soviet 
Union in 1961?
On several later occasions, W ashington o ffe red  to establish diplomatic relations with 
A lbania, but to no avail. By the end o f  the 1940s A lbania would fall under the total 
influence o f  Soviet Union, and later in the 1960s, China.
How ever, the American withdrawal from A lban ia  did not mean the end o f  A m erican 
concern w ith the Albanian question. Very soon A lban ia  was to become the first test o f  the 
new A m erican strategy in the early Cold W ar era .
5. Albania and U .S . S trategy o f  
Rolling Back C om m unism
The Soviet blockade o f  Berlin in 1948 set the  stage  for the beginning o f  the C old  W ar 
in Europe. At that time, all the Eastern European countries (with the exception o f  
Yugoslavia) were communist dictatorships under the  firm grip o f  the Soviet Union. By 
then, W ashington had already abandoned any hopes o f  accommodation with the Soviet 
Union and the establishment of free and dem ocratic  regim es in Eastern Europe, in 
accordance with the Crimea Declaration. Instead, the  containm ent o f communism, 
proclaim ed by George Kennan, would becom e the  new  official doctrine o f  U.S. foreign 
policy. V ery soon, a Balkan crisis would constitu te the first test o f  this doctrine. In M arch
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and Turkey from the threat o f  a com m unist takeover. The .American intervention in the 
Balkan crisis m arked the first m ajor engagem ent o f  the United States in an area 
traditionally under British and European influence. At the same time the Balkan 
operation affirmed the new status o f  the United States as a superpower, with w ider 
interests in Europe and beyond.
It m ust be stressed that despite the success in the Balkans, conservative circles in 
W ashington were not pleased with the containm ent policy, which they considered 
inadequate to save the people o f  Eastern Europe from the communist yoke. Instead, they 
wanted a firmer and a m ore aggressive policy tow ards communism. At the beginning o f  
the 1950s, there was a great deal o f  talk in W ashington about liberation and the rolling 
back o f  com m unism . Liberation becam e the leitm otiv o f  the election agenda o f  the 
Republican Party in the presidential cam paign o f  1952. In fact, during the first term  o f  the 
Eisenhower adm inistration. Secretary o f  State John Foster Dulles openly urged a policy 
calling for the liberation o f  the peoples o f  Eastern Europe.
It was at this tim e that the United States, in collaboration with Britain, chose A lbania 
as the first test o f  the new policy o f  rolling back com m unism . There were several reasons 
for this choice. First, Am erican diplom acy considered A lbania the weakest link in the 
communist chain. Geographically, after the defection o f  Yugoslavia, A lbania was 
separated from the rest o f  the com m unist world, som ething that made its position more 
vulnerable. Econom ically, A lbania was the poorest country in Europe and the new 
com m unist regime had done little to alleviate the sufferings o f  the population. According 
to U.S. intelligence sources, this situation had led to a grow ing dissatisfaction with and
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opposition to the regim e, stronger than in other com m unist countries. A Cl.A (Central 
Intelligence Agency) document stated that, " the present isolation and weakness o f  the 
pro-Soviet A lbanian regim e are important factors, contributing to its basic instability.”’  ^
Second, with the onset o f the Cold War, the strategic position o f  Albania at the 
entrance o f  the Adriatic was considered to be im portant for the W est. A State Departm ent 
docum ent o f  the tim e stated "the United States has a strategic interest in Albania, w hose 
significance derives from its strategic situation and from its part in the complex o f  Balkan 
and Adriatic relations.” ’"* The U.S. was seriously worried about the dangers o f  a possible 
installation o f  a Russian naval base in the port city o f  Vlora, in Southern Albania, which 
had a dom inant position at the entrance o f  the M editerranean.
The third reason was the lack o f  an Am erican em bassy in Albania, something that 
would have no consequences for eventual reprisals o f  the com m unist authorities against 
Am erican subjects and institutions.
U nder these circum stances, the State Departm ent com piled a num ber o f  short and 
long-term  objectives towards Albania. The m ain short-term  objective, as expressed in a 
top-secret State D epartm ent document, dated 21 Septem ber 1949, was "the weakening 
and the eventual elim ination o f the Soviet-dom inated Hoxha regim e.”'** Another short­
term objective was to deny Russia military rights and bases in Albania in time o f  peace. 
The m ain long-range objective was "the establishm ent o f  an Albania, which is free o f  
foreign dom ination and whose government is responsive and responsible to the will o f  
the Albanian peop le .''
The A lbanian question was widely discussed in a m eeting o f  the Policy Planning 
S taff in W ashington on 1 April 1949, which analyzed the U.S. policy towards the Soviet
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Kennan, reached the conclusion that "som ething very definitely might be accom plished 
now in the way o f  assisting in the overthrow o f  the present pro-K rem lin regim e (in 
Albania) or in the setting up o f  a new  regim e which would be anti-Com m unist and 
therefore pro-W estern.
In order to realize these objectives the United States relied on the anti-com m unist 
organizations and groups o f  refugees that had fled Albania im m ediately after the 
establishment o f  the com m unist regim e. In the autumn o f  1949 the United States gave the 
official go-ahead for preparations for an intervention in Albania. The base for the training 
o f  the comm andos was established on the island o f M alta, in the M editerranean, w hile the 
American and British intelligence services set up a jo in t com m and to direct the operation. 
From 1951 to 1954, various groups o f  commandos, com prised o f  Albanian ém igrés in the 
West, were sent into A lbania by air, sea or land with the aim o f  inciting and organizing 
an anti-communist revolt, w hich w as supposed to lead to the overthrow o f  the regime.
However, the operation did not proceed according to the plans o f  the organizers and, 
in the end, it resulted in a com plete failure. The comm andos were unable to incite any 
real opposition to the regim e and m ost o f  them were captured or eliminated by the 
Albanian m ilitary forces. The reasons for this failure are m anifold. For the W est, the 
main culprit is considered to be British Intelligence officer, Kim Philby, who was jo in t 
com m ander o f  the operation and who was revealed to be a Soviet spy. How ever other 
factors came to play. First, the U nited States and Britain overestim ated the extent o f  the 
weakness o f  the com m unist regim e in A lbania as well as the strength o f  the opposition to 
it. In the absence o f  diplom atic representation in the country, m ost o f  the inform ation on
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Albania cam e from Yugoslav sources, which, because o f  the recent split and bitter 
relations betw een the two countries, tried to present an unrealistic picture o f  Albania. 
Second, by placing too m uch hope on the traditionally pro-Am erican sentiments o f  the 
A lbanian people, W ashington had also underestim ated the effect o f  the indoctrination o f  
the population by the com m unists’ propaganda. Third, most o f  the émigrés that were sent 
as com m andos were discredited figures because o f  their former collaboration during the 
war w ith the Italian and G erm an forces, and they did not enjoy great prestige am ong the 
native population.
The attem pts to organize an anti-com m unist uprising and overthrow  the com m unist 
regim e m arked the highest stage o f  Am erican engagem ent in the Albanian question. This 
act further consolidated the anti-A m erican orientation o f  the com m unist regime in 
Albania, dashing any hope for a possible reestablishm ent o f diplom atic relations.
The failure o f  the Albanian operation would serve as an im portant lesson for future 
A m erican policy towards the com m unist countries in Eastern Europe. The Albanian 
exam ple helped to convince W ashington o f  the im possibility o f  the strategy o f  rolling 
back com m unism  in Eastern Europe and its replacem ent with pro-W estern regimes. The 
containm ent policy once again becam e the official doctrine o f  W ashington. It was at this 
time, after the death o f Stalin and the com ing to pow er o f  Khrushchev, a more pragm atic 
leader, that the United States cam e to accept the realities o f  the Cold W ar and began to 
observe the division o f spheres o f  influence in Europe. This was best illustrated in the 
case o f  the Hungarian uprising in 1956, when the United States, w hile playing a m ajor 
role in its incitem ent, did nothing to help the insurgents in the face o f  brutal Soviet 
intervention.
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In accordance with new historic developm ents, by the late 1950s. the United States 
began to adopt a new policy towards the com m unist countries o f  Eastern Europe, that o f  
differentiation, which consisted o f  encouraging, wherever possible, an independent 
course, away from Soviet dom ination, w ithout provoking a Russian m ilitary intervention. 
This was the case with Yugoslavia and later with Romania. Albania, to a lesser degree, 
was to become part o f  this new policy.
6. The Long Freeze
A fter failing at their attempt to overthrow the com m unist regime in A lbania from 
within, the American governm ent began to adopt a new course o f  rapprochem ent and 
friendly gestures tow ard Albania. In 1955, the United States withdrew its objection to 
Albania joining the United Nations. The same year, president Eisenhower announced that 
W ashington, for the first time, would send a quantity o f  food aid to Albania, since its 
food supplies were dwindling seriously. Although this offer was rejected by the 
com m unist regime in Tirana, it signaled a significant shift in U.S. policy towards 
Albania. In fact, it was precisely at this time that the State Department had reached the 
conclusion that the lack o f  an American diplomatic m ission in Albania constituted a 
disadvantage for the achievement o f  American objectives in this country and that it was 
time to explore the possibilities for the establishment o f  diplom atic relations. A National 
Security Council study, dated 20 N ovem ber 1957, noted that “there has been no 
significant progress in the achievement o f  U.S. national objectives with respect to 
Bulgaria and A lbania,” (relations w ith Bulgaria were frozen until 1960), and that it was 
desirable “to consider the advantages and disadvantages o f  the resumption o f  diplom atic
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relations with Bulgaria, and possibly also with Albania ' A nother National Security 
Council Report, dated 24 May 1958. noted that. “Albania presents special problem s to 
U.S. policy because it has traditionally been subject to rival claim s and am bitions by- 
Greece, Italy and Y ugoslavia.” '"* In particular, W ashington considered the m ilitary 
penetration and presence o f  Russia in Albania as very dangerous for Am erican secunty 
interests in the Eastern M editerranean region.
Under these circum stances and in the absence o f  direct diplom atic relations, the 
United States tried to encourage the other W estern countries to establish diplom atic 
relations and increase their contacts with Albania in order to strengthen W estern 
influence there and to counter, to som e extent, Soviet dom inance. W ashington welcomed 
A lbania’s break with the Soviet Union in 1961, considering this developm ent as the best 
chance to resume its o ffer for the establishm ent o f  diplomatic relations. However, any 
hope in this direction w as quickly dashed with the rapid shift o f  Albania toward close ties 
with China, a move that was m otivated by ideological and econom ic reasons. In spite o f 
this new turn in A lbania’s politics, W ashington continued to stick to its strategy o f  
courting the Albanian leaders, trying to open other possible channels o f  comm unication 
with that country. In 1966, for the first time, the U.S. Department o f  Com m erce allowed 
the export o f  some non-strategic goods to Albania while the State Departm ent removed 
the restrictions on travel o f  U.S. citizens to Albania.
It is interesting to note that by that time, the United States had dropped its previous 
insistence on the validity o f  the pre-w ar bilateral treaties as a precondition for the 
establishment o f  diplom atic relations with Albania. Thus, in a conversation in 
W ashington with the Italian Counselor, Piero Ferraboschi, in M arch 1972, the Director o f
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the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Y ugosla\ affairs at the State Department, Richard Johnson, 
pointed out that “the United States G overnm ent would welcome the norm alization o f  
relations with A lbania” and that “the obligations contained in the pre-war U .S.-A lbanian 
bilateral agreements would appear no longer to possess substantial intrinsic 
im portance.”"' This new American approach toward Albania was reaffirmed by the U.S. 
D eputy Secretary o f  State, Kenneth R ush, who, in a m ajor speech on U.S. policy towards 
Eastern Europe at the Naval A cadem y in Annapolis, on 4 April 1973, stressed that if  
A lbania w ished to resum e relations w ith  the United States, “it will find us prepared to 
respond.”^^
However, all these offers were rejected  by the Hoxha regime in Tirana, which 
continued to consider the United States, along with the Soviet Union, the greatest 
enem ies o f  peace and freedom o f  the peoples o f  the world. Hoxha reiterated that A lbania 
will never maintain relations with the tw o superpowers.^
The United States welcomed A lban ia’s break w ith China in the late 1970s, 
concluding that after this, “Albania w as now following a course independent o f  any 
m ajor p o w e r .W a s h in g to n  had hoped that after losing the services o f another big 
pow er, Albania, because o f her precarious economic and security position, would turn for 
help to the W est, including the United States. It is for this reason that W ashington once 
again resumed its offer for the establishm ent o f  diplom atic relations. During a hearing 
before a Subcom mittee o f  the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on 10 June 1981, the 
Assistant Secretary o f  State for European Affairs, Laurence Eagleburger, stressed that 
“should A lbania display an interest in resum ing relations with us, we would be prepared 
to respond.” "^*
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Tirana again rejected this new offer. In fact, the new course o f  independence from the 
m ajor powers, as described by W ashington, led to the further isolation o f  .Albania from 
the international arena. At that tim e, Albania was the only country in Europe that refused 
to participate at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well 
as the only com m unist country in Eastern Europe not to have diplom atic relations with 
the major western pow ers such as the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.
The death, on 11 April 1985, o f  Enver Hoxha, the com m unist dictator who had ruled 
Albania with an iron fist for nearly four decades, renewed hopes in the West for a major 
reorientation o f  A lbania 's course in the international arena. It is interesting to note that 
the United States reacted sw iftly to H oxha’s death, trying to seize this opportunity by 
extending a new offer for the establishm ent o f  diplom atic relations. Thus, on the day o f 
H oxha’s death, the State Departm ent spokesman, Edward Djerejian, when asked to 
comment on this developm ent, reiterated once m ore that, “should Albania indicate an 
interest in resum ing relations w ith the United States, we would be prepared to respond.”"*** 
Once again the response from Tirana was negative. Although H oxha’s successor, 
Ram iz Alia, began to adopt a m ore pragmatic approach towards the W est, as was 
demonstrated w ith the establishm ent o f  diplom atic relations w ith W est Germany, Canada, 
and other W estern powers, he continued to abide to the old H oxha policy in opposing any 
relations with the United States or the Soviet Union, still considering them “dangerous 
and aggressive superpow ers.’**'
The end o f  the Cold W ar and the fall o f  the com m unist regim es in Eastern Europe 
forced the com m unist leadership in Albania to outline, at the beginning o f  the 1990s, a 
new course for its dom estic and foreign policy, publicly expressing, for the first time its
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readiness to establish diplom atic relations with the United States. Finally, a long freeze 
w as com ing to an end, while a new page would open in the history o f  bilateral .American 
-  A lbanian relations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PRESENT
1. A lban ia’s Transition to Democracy and the 
Role o f  the United States 
The end o f  the 1980s brought about dram atic changes in the political map o f  Europe. 
As a result o f  w ide-spread popular pressures from inside and the prolonged economic 
crisis, as well as the w ithdraw al o f  Soviet support, the com m unist regim es in Eastern 
Europe fell one after another, paving the w ay for the establishm ent o f  pluralism and a 
market economy. This was a strategic victory for the W est, especially for the United 
States, which had waged a long battle for the defeat o f  comm unism .
After the revolutions o f  the l980s, the United States, with the dissolution o f the Soviet 
Union, rem ained the sole superpow er and actively engaged in assisting the East European 
countries in the difficult transition from comm unism  to democracy. This role was most 
evident in the case o f  Albania, which, more than any other East European country, owes 
its transition to dem ocracy to the United States. Given the rigidity o f  T irana 's  brand o f 
comm unism  and the long isolation o f  the country, W ashington was conscious that 
A lbania's transition to dem ocracy would be more difficult and prolonged compared to 
other East European countries. Ignoring the events in the rest o f  Eastern Europe, the 
Albanian com m unist leadership, in spite o f  some limited reforms, continued to refuse any
35
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change in the political system , insisting on the validity o f communism. Under these 
circumstances. W ashington tried to com bine political and economic pressures with 
diplom atic approaches in order to force the Tirana regime into accepting political 
pluralism.
In the spring o f  1990, feeling m ore and m ore isolated from the general trends in 
Europe, the Albanian leadership expressed, for the first time, the desire to reestablish 
diplom atic relations with the U nited States. The response from W ashington was that, 
before this, Tirana had to undertake significant steps towards the establishm ent o f  
political pluralism and dem ocracy. In testim ony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, James Baker, then Secretary o f  State, stressed that the United States would 
link the restoration o f  diplom atic relations with Albania to Tirana’s acceptance o f  
political pluralism and a m ovem ent towards a market economy. ' The same m essage was 
comm unicated directly to A lbanian President Ramiz Alia from Congressm an Tom 
Lantos, who in M ay 1990 becam e the first U.S. official to visit Albania in m ore than four 
decades.
As a result o f  concerted Am erican and W estern pressures, as well as growing internal 
unrest, in Decem ber 1990 the A lbanian leadership finally accepted political pluralism, 
becoming the last com m unist country in Eastern Europe to take such a step. New general 
elections were set for the spring o f  1991.
These developm ents created the possibility for the resumption o f  Albanian -Am erican 
relations. On 15 M arch 1991, after som e months o f  negotiations, the United States and 
Albania signed an agreem ent in W ashington for the formal establishment o f  diplom atic 
relations, ending a gap o f  more than ha lf a century. This was an historic developm ent in
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the bilateral relations o f  the two countries. For m any Albanians, who had great hopes in 
the United States, this was a welcome development.
At this stage, the United States considered that a diplom atic presence in Tirana would 
better serve .American interests in facilitating a sm ooth transition from comm unism  to 
dem ocracy in A lbania and ensuring a kind o f  internal stability at a tim e when new threats 
o f  war were hanging over the Balkans. At the sam e tim e, W ashington concluded that only 
the victory o f  the opposition forces in the com ing spring election would bring stability to 
Albania. Thus the Am erican envoys in Albania openly  supported the electoral campaign 
o f  the opposition forces. However, despite these efforts, keeping in m ind the shortness o f  
time and a lack in organization o f  the still young opposition forces, the M arch 1991 
elections resulted in the victory o f  the former com m unist forces. This result had direct 
influence on Am erican-Albanian relations. The U nited States, contrary to the stand o f  
some W estern European countries, such as Italy, w as quick to react, considering the 
elections unfair and not free, and dem anding their repetition." W ashington m ade it clear 
that any economic aid o r political support to A lbania would be linked to w hat it called 
real progress to dem ocracy.
The continued pressures from the United States and from som e other W estern 
countries, as well as the deterioration o f  the internal economic and political situation in 
Albania finally led to the collapse o f  the com m unist governm ent and the formation, in 
June 1991, o f  a coalition government with the participation, for the first tim e, o f  the 
opposition forces. N ew  general elections were set for the beginning o f  the com ing year. 
This development, w hich was welcom ed by W ashington, created new  possibilities for the 
advancem ent o f  bilateral relations between the two countries. Shortlv after this, with the
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recom m endation and support o f  the United States. Albania was admitted as a full member 
o f  the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe {now Organization o f  Security 
and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE). A lbania had been the only country in Europe not to 
participate in this organization since its inauguration in 1975. Some days later, on 22 June 
1991, Secretary o f  State Jam es Baker visited Tirana, the first U.S. high-ranking official to 
visit this country for m ore than ha lf a century.
B aker’s visit had three significant aims. First, it demonstrated the norm alization o f  the 
bilateral relations and the increasing interest o f  U.S. diplomacy towards A lbania at a time 
when W ashington was foreseeing new turbulence in the Balkans as a result o f  the 
imm inent disintegration o f  Yugoslavia. This m essage was made clear by Baker w hen he 
told thousands o f  A lbanians, gathered at the m ain square in Tirana, that after h a lf  a 
century o f  no contacts, “America was returning to you.” ’ Second, this visit aim ed at 
pressuring the present leaders o f  Albania to continue with political and econom ic 
reform s, while trying to boost the chances o f  the anti-communist opposition forces to win 
the com ing election. Towards this end, during his speech at the Albanian parliam ent.
Baker stated that he was visiting the country after a personal invitation from the 
opposition leader. Sali Berisha, a declaration that caused concern and surprised the high- 
ranking ex-com m unist officials present at the ceremony."* Meanwhile, in a separate 
m eeting with Berisha and other representatives o f  the opposition forces. Baker urged 
them to unite and work together so that they could win the next parliam entary election.
But, more than anything else. B aker’s visit to Tirana allowed the Albanian people to 
dem onstrate their strong support for Am erica, and the high hopes, though som ew hat 
naive, they had placed on U.S. aid and assistance. This was shown by the m ultitude o f
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people gathered at the main square o f  T irana (200.000 people out o f  the 500.000 
inhabitants o f  Tirana at that time). Later, in his memoir. Baker would admit that during 
his fifteen years in public life, he had never seen a reception such as that in Albania. "The 
outpouring o f  genuine affection and support,” Baker would write, "was because o f  the 
symbol o f  hope that America represents to people like this, who had had nothing to hope 
for so very  long.”'
Follow ing Baker’s visit, W ashington increased its economic support and cooperation 
with A lbania, abolishing a num ber o f  restrictions in the field o f  trade and immigration 
that existed since the communist period. M eanwhile, U.S. representatives in Tirana and 
Am erican institutions, such as the Republican and Democratic National Institutes, were 
actively involved in the support and organization o f  the election cam paign o f  the 
Dem ocratic Party, the main opposition party. In particular, the U.S. am bassador to 
Tirana, W illiam  Ryerson, in an unusual m ove, greatly surpassed his diplom atic role, 
constantly appearing together with the opposition leader. Sali Berisha, at the rallies o f  the 
Dem ocratic Party, and calling on the people to vote for Berisha and his party. In no other 
former com m unist country in Eastern Europe was a U.S. ambassador seen playing such a 
role during an election campaign.
A m erican support was crucial for the landslide victory o f  the opposition Democratic 
Party in the M arch 1992 election. By this tim e the Albanian electorate had become very 
sensitive to the position o f  the United States, whose support they relied upon for the 
security o f  the country and its future integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.
W ashington was quick to consider the new  election as free and fair and pledged to 
establish close links with the new governm ent and support Albania on the road to reforms
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and democracy. For his part, Berisha, who was elected the new president o f  the country, 
wasted no time in expressing his pro-American position, considering the relations with 
the United States as the first priority o f  the new government. These declarations caused 
some concern in W estern Europe, especially in Italy, which at that tim e was the main 
financial contributor to A lbania and considered itself the natural ally and protector o f  the 
country.
2. The Berisha Government and the G olden Years o f  
U.S. -  Albanian Relations 
Following the victory o f  the Democratic Party in M arch 1992, and the election o f 
Berisha as President, the relations between Albania and the United States greatly 
improved. In fact, the years 19 9 2 -1995, which coincided with the rule o f  the Democratic 
Party, can be described as the golden years in Am erican-Albanian relations, when 
W ashington took a special interest in Albania. There are a num ber o f  reasons for this 
development.
First, with the spread o f  the w ar in the former Yugoslavia and a possible flare up o f 
the conflict in Kosova, the Berisha government considered the Am erican support the 
m ain guarantee for the security and independence o f  his country. Berisha did not put 
much trust in Italy and the other W est European powers, which, he thought, historically 
had sided with the Serbs and the Greeks at the expense o f  A lbania 's territorial integrity. 
Second, there were internal political considerations. Berisha counted on American 
support as a counterweight to the open support o f  the Italian socialist governm ent o f  
Betino Craxi for the Socialist party o f  Albania ( former com m unists), headed by the
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former Prim e M inister. Fatos Nano. Third, on a personal note, Berisha w anted to use his 
strong pro-American rhetoric and orientation as a shield against all those on the left and 
the far right, who considered him an offspring o f  the former com m unist regim e because 
o f  his past m em bership in the Com m unist party.
As for the United States, W ashington had a  strategic interest in its strong support for, 
and close relations with, the Berisha governm ent. The years 1992-1995 coincided with 
the bloody conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia as well as with a growing involvem ent o f  the 
United States in the Yugoslav conflict. U nder these conditions, W ashington considered 
Albania as a valuable partner in its efforts to contain the Yugoslav conflict and ensure 
stability in the region. First, the U.S. counted on  its ties with A lbania to use its territory 
for conducting m ilitary and recorm aissance m issions in the war zone. This w as o f  
strategic importance at a tim e when other countries in the region, such as M acedonia and 
Greece, had refused to give such perm ission. Second, W ashington aim ed to use the 
influence o f  the Berisha governm ent in order to m oderate any nationalist m anifestations 
on the part o f  the Albanian leaders in K osova and urged them to negotiate w ith Milosevic 
in order to prevent another w ar zone in Kosova. At a tim e when the United States was 
engaged in resolving the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, Berisha provided a great service 
to American interests in the region. W ashington was conscious that A lbania could not 
fulfill these m issions without internal stability  and economic developm ent. It is for these 
reasons that during this period the A m erican governm ent invested heavily (m ilitarily, 
politically and economically) in its support for A lbania 's Democratic governm ent and 
specifically for Berisha who was considered the only person that could stop the country 's 
slide back into chaos."
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a. The M ilitary Connections 
It is no surprise that the U .S.-A lbanian ties were most evident in the m ilitai}' field. 
Since the beginning o f the Berisha governm ent, we witness a constant increase in the 
presence o f  U.S. military missions and personnel in Albania. In 1992. the two countries 
signed a m emorandum o f  understanding which tied the Albanian Defense M inistry with 
the U.S. com m and Headquarters in Europe. Follow ing this agreement, a num ber o f  
Am erican m ilitary advisors were appointed to the A lbanian Defense M inistry and a U.S. 
liaison office w as opened in this ministry. In 1994, a second militai}' agreem ent was 
signed, which included, for the first tim e, the provision o f  certain equipment for the 
A lbanian army. With the intensification o f  the conflict in Bosnia, the U.S. m ilitary began 
to conduct a num ber o f jo in t military exercises with the Albanian army, in preparation for 
the use o f  A lbanian territory for a possible com bat or peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. A 
num ber o f  jo in t land and naval exercises w ere held during 1995 alone, including an 
engineering exercise, the first o f  its kind in Eastern Europe.® The Albanian m inister o f  
D efense, Safet Zhulali, was at that time a frequent visitor to the Pentagon, while many 
U.S. high-ranking military officials, including Defense Secretary William Perry, visited 
Albania. In one o f  these visits, the U.S. A ssistant Secretary o f Defense, Joseph Nye, 
stressed that, “W ashington believed A lbania to be a p illar o f  stability in the Balkans.” '* 
M eanwhile, strong cooperation was established betw een the Central Intelligence 
A gency (CIA) and the Albanian Intelligence Agency. In the spring o f 1993, the CIA took 
over a m ilitary airfield in the northern part o f  the country, near the border with 
M ontenegro, in order to prepare it as a base for unm anned observation flights over 
Bosnia. In July 1995, the United States deployed two Predator spy planes in this airfield
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to conduct reconnaissance m issions over Bosnia in order to gather intelligence on the 
location o f  troops and w eapons. About 100 American m ilitary and civilian personnel 
were stationed at the base, the most significant U.S. m ilitary deploym ent ever in 
Albania."*
It was by this tim e that the U.S. showed an open interest for the island o f  Sazani, a 
strategic location at the entrance o f  the M editerranean and a form er Soviet naval base. 
num ber o f  U.S. m ilitary experts visited the island and work began for the m odernization 
o f  m ilitary facilities.
For his part, Berisha stated on m ore than one occasion that the Albanian governm ent 
was ready to place its airports, seaports, and other facilities at the disposal o f  the United 
States and NATO for any  possible use in the region."
b. The NATO Dim ension
Since the beginning, the Berisha government considered closer ties and entrance into 
the Atlantic Alliance as a m atter o f  strategic interest for the country. In fact, A lbania was 
the first country in Eastern Europe to file in 1992 a formal application for m em bership to 
NATO, an application that was politely turned down. The former Secretary General o f  
NATO, the late M anfred W omer, was a frequent visitor to Tirana and cultivated strong 
personal ties with Berisha. Although the Unites States had never expressed any open 
approval for A lbania’s m em bership in NATO, the impression among analysts at that time 
was that W ashington w as pushing in that direction. In 1994 Albania was among the first 
countries to jo in  N A T O ’s Partnership for Peace program , which was launched by the 
Clinton adm inistration, as a first step before gaining full m em bership. W ith the end o f  the 
Yugoslav conflict and the internal instability caused by the fall o f  the pyram id schem es in
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1997, the chances o f  Albania jo in ing  NA TO dim inished. However, A lbania is still among 
the nine candidates that are under discussion for admittance to the alliance in a second 
round o f  enlargem ent.
c. Political Ties
A nother example o f  the strong bilateral ties that existed during that period between 
the two countries was the intensity o f  diplom atic contacts at the highest levels. In June 
1992, less than three months after his election as President, Berisha visited the United 
States and m et with President Bush at the W hite House. This was the first such summit in 
the history o f  the two countries. In 1993 the A lbanian Prime M inister A leksander Meksi 
met with President Clinton at the W hite House, while in 1995 President Berisha 
conducted his second official visit to W ashington where he discussed regional issues and 
bilateral m ilitary and economic cooperation w ith President Clinton. During these 
discussions, Clinton valued A lbania’s important and responsible role in regional affairs, 
while both sides expressed their com m itm ent to further strengthen bilateral t ie s . '' The 
U.S. am bassador to the United Nations, M adeleine Albright, and other high-ranking U.S. 
officials visited Albania during the 1994-1996 period.
d. Economic Connections 
Along with improvements in m ilitary and political ties with the Berisha governm ent, 
there was also an increase in Am erican economic assistance for Albania. In a boost for 
the Berisha governm ent, in 1992 W ashington granted Albania most favored nation status 
in trade and abolished a number o f  restrictions for Albanian products and U.S. companies 
operating in Albania. In 1995 the tw o countries concluded a treaty for the encouragem ent 
and reciprocal protection o f  investments. That sam e year W ashington established a S30
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m illion Albanian-Am erican Enterprise Fund to encourage private Am erican com panies to 
invest in A lbania. A num ber o f  Am erican com panies secured government contracts in 
A lbania, especially in the fields o f  oil. telecom m unications and mining. It is estimated 
that during the period from 1991 to l9 9 5 , W ashington granted Albania m ore than $250 
m illion in technical and hum anitarian assistance, which m ade the U.S. A lbania’s second 
highest contributor o f  foreign aid, after I ta ly .C o m p a r e d  with the small size o f  the 
A lbanian population o f  3.5 m illion inhabitants, this sum is the largest granted to any 
form er com m unist country in the Balkans. U.S. support was crucial to A lban ia’s entry 
during  this period to the W orld Bank and the International M onetary Fund as well as to 
securing considerable loans and assistance from these powerful financial institutions, 
dom inated by  W ashington.
For m any observers, B erisha’s strong pro-A m erican policy and close ties with 
W ashington was in keeping with A lbania’s traditional concern to seek refuge in the arms 
o f  a superpow er in order to protect its sovereignty from the threats o f  its m ore powerful 
neighbors. In fact, for Albania, this was a new edition o f  its love affair w ith a 
superpow er, after the bitter experiences w ith the Soviet Union and China. A s for the 
U nited States, the establishment o f  close ties w ith Albania ser\ ed American strategic 
aim s in the Balkans, in preventing a further spillover o f  the conflict in the South.
How ever, as time would prove, by 1996, with the end o f  the Yugoslav conflict and 
the internal upheavals in Albanian politics, the U .S.-A lbanian honeymoon w ould com e to 
an end, testifying once more to the sudden turns o f  A lbania’s foreign policy.
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3. The Fall o f  an Idol 
The year 1996 was a bad one for U .S.-A lbanian relations. In M ay 1996 new general 
elections were organized in Albania. The Dem ocratic Party, which had ruled the country 
for four years, had hoped for another landslide victory. But the political situation in the 
country had changed. In spite of some econom ic and political gains, the population had 
begun to feel the effects o f  the market reform s, w hich initially led to rising 
unem ploym ent and prices, while there was grow ing discontent with the widespread 
corruption o f  the officials. On the other hand, the form er com m unist party, now turned 
socialist, had reform ed itse lf along the lines o f  other socialist parties in Eastern Europe 
and seemed to be m ore acceptable to the electorate. M eanwhile, the U.S. am bassador 
W illiam Ryerson, Berisha’s main supporter, was no longer in Tirana. Keeping in m ind 
the new political situation in Albania and past criticism  for interfering in the internal 
affairs o f  the country, the United States tried to adopt a m ore neutral stand with the 
com ing o f  the new  elections.
In fact, the M ay 1996 elections turned out to cause a great am ount o f  damage to the 
democratic processes in Albania. Arrogant in its aim s to secure by all means another 
historic victory, the Democratic Party tried to m anipulate the vote, resorting to m any 
irregularities and open pressure against the opposition forces and its supporters. This 
created a bad im age abroad for the democratic credentials o f  the Democratic Party. In 
fact, the international community criticized the election, which was won by B erisha’s 
Party by a large m argin, as unfair and far from dem ocratic standards. To some surprise, 
the United States turned out to be the most critical foreign pow er o f  the May 1996 
election. The State Departm ent issued a statem ent saying it considered the elections “a
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significant step backw ard from the previous parliam entary election in Albania in 1992." 
while dem anding a revote in a considerable num ber o f  districts.'■* This was the first open 
schism between W ashington and its closest ally in Albania. Berisha. W ashington let it be 
known to Berisha that unless he undertook m easures to amend the flawed M ay election, 
the United States w ould not support the governm ent that would emerge from the new 
parliament. In fact, contrary to the stand o f  som e other W estern powers, Am erican 
diplom ats boycotted the inaugural session o f  the new parliament. This was another sign 
o f  the split between the Berisha governm ent and the United States. Throughout the 
summ er o f  1996, W ashington urged Berisha to review  the voting process, even raising 
the stakes by dem anding the organization o f  new  elections. When in August 1996 
Berisha refused to m eet Clinton’s special envoy, T im othy Wirth, who was sent to Tirana 
to discuss the flawed electoral process and hum an rights concerns raised by  the 
opposition, it was c lear that the honeymoon betw een Berisha and W ashington w as finally 
over.
All these developm ents had a negative influence on the relations between the two 
countries, leading to a freeze in a num ber o f  jo in t projects and initiatives. In testim ony 
before the House o f  Representative’s Subcom m ittee on Human Rights and International 
Operations, on 25 Ju ly  1996, Senior Deputy A ssistant Secretary o f  State Rudolph Perina 
announced that in view  o f  Berisha’s refusal to com ply w ith the U.S. and International 
com m unity dem ands as related to the May 1996 election, the United States had initiated a 
thorough review o f  its relations with Albania, including assistance program s."
For som e political analysts the schism betw een W ashington and Berisha, who at the 
beginning o f  the 1990s was considered the m ost pro-A m erican leader in Eastern Europe,
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was a bit o f  surprise. However, there existed a num ber o f  issues and reasons for the shift 
in that direction.
a. Human Rights Concerns 
W ith the coming to power o f  the Clinton adm inistration. Washington put m ore 
emphasis on the issue o f  hum an rights, considering it one o f  the main pillars o f  its 
relations with other countries, including the new dem ocracies o f  Eastern Europe. As in 
the case o f  Lukashenko in Byelorussia or M eciar in Slovakia, Washington becam e 
preoccupied with some aspects o f  hum an rights abuses on the part o f the Berisha 
government, especially towards the opposition. In the sum m er o f  1993, Fatos N ano, the 
leader o f  the Socialist Party, the biggest opposition party, was jailed under charges o f 
corruption. For m any observers, that was a political act on the part o f  B erisha 's  
government. M eanwhile, in the sum m er o f  1994 the prem ises o f  the newspaper “ Koha 
Jone,” the biggest independent paper in the country, was burned by unknown persons, 
believed to be governm ent secret agents. All these acts could not go unnoticed in 
W ashington, where government officials also began to be preoccupied with the harsh 
stand o f  Berisha towards the small Greek m inority in Albania. In late 1994 the A lbanian 
authorities arrested and put in ja il a num ber o f  leaders o f  the Greek m inority  
organization, “Om onia,” accusing them o f  espionage. This incident caused serious 
frictions in Albanian-Greek relations. Trying to avoid another crisis in the Balkans, 
W ashington called on both parties for a dialogue and put pressure on Berisha to release 
the Om onian leaders. For a period Berisha defied these requests, causing further strains in 
the two country’s relations. Thus, a planned visit o f  Berisha to the United States in 1995 
was m ade conditional upon the release o f  the Om onian leaders. At the same tim e.
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W ashington put on hold plans for a S30 m illion A lbania-American Enterprise Fund.'" 
Although Berisha later bowed to A m erican pressure and the O m onian leaders were 
released, this incident tarnished the hum an rights credentials o f  the B erisha governm ent 
and was a warning for the Am erican adm inistration.
b. N ationalist Tendencies 
As m entioned, from the beginning Berisha allied Albanian foreign policy  with the 
needs o f  American strategy in the region and put the national territory at the disposal o f  
the United States and NATO . At the sam e tim e, in accordance with W ashington’s 
requests, Berisha tried to play a m oderate ro le in A lbania’s relations w ith  neighboring 
countries and to quell any nationalist tendencies o f  Albanians living in those countries, 
especially in Kosova. But with the passing o f  tim e, this stand began to change, som etim es 
taking the form o f  nationalism. The first m anifestation o f  this stand was as early  as 1993 
in M acedonia. During the autumn o f  that year, there was a power struggle within the 
Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the biggest party o f  Albanians in M acedonia, 
which, at that time, was part o f  the coalition governm ent. A radical faction, led by 
M enduh Thaci and A rber Xhaferi, criticized the existing leadership o f  the party for 
com prom ising the rights o f  the A lbanian com m unity. Berisha allied h im se lf  w ith the 
radical group in their criticism  against the leadership o f  the PDP, which at that tim e 
seem ed closer to the opposition socialist party  in Albania. This official stand o f  Tirana in 
support o f  the radical group, which advocated a confrontational stand toward the 
M acedonian governm ent, caused some friction in A lbania’s relationship w ith  M acedonia. 
The United States was concem ed that this developm ent could radicalize the dem ands o f  
the A lbanians in M acedonia, leading to a destabilization o f  the country. For this reason.
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W ashington exerted pressure on Berisha to m oderate his support for the radicals and 
engage in a m ore constructive policy towards M acedonia, som ething that later resulted in 
a num ber o f  bilateral agreem ents between the two countries.
Berisha m anifested  this same unpredictable policy  w ith raising nationalist tones 
towards Kosova, too, especially in periods o f  intense internal political conflicts in 
Albania. Thus in 1996, during the opposition dem onstrations in Belgrade. Berisha called 
on Albanians in K osova to organize street protests, com ing out against the peaceful 
policy o f  K osovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, a policy that, for pragmatic reasons, at that 
time enjoyed the support o f  the United States.
c. Authoritarian Tendencies 
Like m any o ther East European leaders o f  the tim e, such as W alesa in Poland. Iliescu 
in Romania and M eciar in Slovakia, Berisha proved to be a very authoritarian and 
controversial political personality. To some extent it w as W ashington that nourished 
these tendencies. A t the initial stages o f  dem ocracy in Albania, W ashington needed a 
strong hand in the country  in order to ensure a kind o f  stability  in the chaotic Balkans. .At 
that tim e the United States encouraged an American m odel o f  the presidency in Albania, 
believing that a strong president could stabilize the country and moderate its stand 
towards neighbors. T his was evident in the draft Constitution o f  1994, which was written 
with the aid o f  A m erican experts. But this American m odel backfired in Albania and the 
draft Constitution, w hich envisaged sweeping powers for the President, was decisively 
rejected in a national referendum . The Albanian people, who had suffered for a long time 
under a dictatorship, had no desire for another dictator. M oreover, Albania lacked the
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political culture o f  the United States, and Berisha him self was a product o f  the former 
com m unist regime.
Taking the Am erican support for granted. Berisha continued to concentrate power in 
his hands, trying to dom inate his own party and to put under government control every 
aspect o f  political life, including the judiciary  system and mass media. This caused a 
large amount o f friction even with his close allies. On several occasions, the U.S. had to 
interv ene in the internal quarrels o f  the Dem ocratic Party in order to avoid any possible 
political crises in the country. Thus, in 1995, W ashington tried to solve a political 
confrontation that em erged at that time betw een Berisha and his closest ally, Eduard 
Selami (then Chairman o f  the party) as well as another dispute with the Head o f  
Cassation, Z ef Brozi, over the competencies o f  the judiciary branch o f  government. In 
both cases, in order to quell the internal political strife, W ashington invited Selami and 
Brozi to the United States and granted them political asylum.
These developments increased the perception in W ashington o f  Berisha as an 
authoritarian leader, and led to concerns over his unpredictable nature. The bitter polem ic 
with Selami was especially harmful for Berisha because Selami was considered one o f  
the most pro-American leaders in the Democratic Party.
d. The New Geo-Strategic Setting
One o f  the main explanations for the precipitated downfall o f  Berisha’s credentials in 
his relations with his patron, the United States, was the change after 1995 o f  the geo­
strategic situation in the Balkans. For much o f  the period from 1992-95 the United States 
ignored domestic and international criticism towards the increasing authoritarian style o f  
governm ent used by Berisha. Due to concerns about the unresolved conflicts in Bosnia
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strategic prom inence in the eyes o f  the United States, w hich was more concem ed with the 
stability o f  the country and its role in the U.S. strategy in the Balkans than with the 
authoritarian rule and hum an right abuses o f  Berisha. For W ashington. Berisha was 
considered the only personality who could ensure stability in the country, allying Albania 
firmly to the U nited States. This stand was in accordance with the realist theory, when for 
its national self-interests the United States has com e to the support o f  various dictatorial 
or undemocratic regim es. This has been the case with U.S. support for Pinochet in Chile, 
Saudi Arabia, and now w ith Pakistan and Uzbekistan.
However, after the signing o f  the Dayton A ccords in December 1995 and with a 
relatively calm  situation in Kosova, the strategic im portance o f  A lbania diminished 
somewhat in the eyes o f  the American adm inistration." W ashington’s stand towards 
Berisha was greatly influenced by this new geo-strategic setting as well as an increased 
emphasis on hum an rights by the Clinton adm inistration. The flawed 1996 election and 
Berisha’s refusal to heed the criticism  and recom m endations o f  the U nited States and the 
international com m unity sealed his divorce with his form er protectors and supporters. 
After that, it was clear that Berisha lost once and for all favor with the United States, 
which began to consider him  a dangerous and unpredictable element, unable to maintain 
the stability o f  the country and to respect the values o f  democracy.'®
4. The Socialists -  The New U.S. Allies in Albania
Following the M ay 1996 elections, Albania entered into a period o f  intense internal 
political squabbles and confrontations, which severely underm ined the democratic
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process and the image o f  the country as a stabilizing factor in the Balkans. This situation 
took a worse turn at the beginning o f  1997 with the collapse o f  the pyramid schemes. 
During the period 1994-96 in Albania, a num ber o f  com panies operated and began to 
collect the savings o f  the population by prom ising m uch higher interest rates than the 
banks. Som e o f  these com panies, in order to disguise their true nature, w ere involved in 
charitable activities. Thousands o f  Albanians, w ho w ere dependent on the get rich quick 
investments for their livelihood, lost their life savings. Up to that time, the government 
seemed to have tolerated the activity o f  these fraudulent schem es in an apparent attempt 
to lessen the burden o f  poveity  and unemployment. So, it was not a surprise that, after the 
fall o f  the pyram id schem es, the frustration and anger o f  the population turned towards 
the government, blam ing it for not taking the proper m easures to prevent such a 
development. This led to w idespread unrest and an arm ed revolt that underm ined the 
governm ent’s authority over most part o f the country.
M eanwhile, the socialists and other opposition forces tried to take advantage o f  this 
development, giving their full support to the m ass protests and calling for earlier general 
elections. This further deepened the political crisis and divisions between the government 
and opposition, while the country slid into anarchy.
This situation alerted the international com m unity, which greatly feared that the 
instability in A lbania could spread to Kosova and other areas, endangering the fragile 
status quo that existed in the Balkans after the Dayton accords. The OSCE sent a special 
mission to Albania, headed by the former Austrian chancellor, Frantz Vranitzki, in order 
to find a solution to the internal political crisis. .At the same time, a multinational
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protection force headed by Italy was sent to Albania to secure the delivery o f  essential 
foods and guarantee the freedom o f  movement along the m ain com m unication routes.
From the beginning o f  this crisis, the United States gave its full backing to the 
international m ilitary and political missions in A lbania, and an Am erican envoy was 
appointed to the Vranitzki delegation. Washington threw its support to the demonstrators, 
w hich were organized by the socialist opposition, m aking it clear that they favored the 
resignation o f  president Berisha as a quick solution to the political crisis. In fact, the U.S. 
openly boycotted the parliam entary session, which was convened in the midst o f the 
crisis, in M arch 1997, to reelect Berisha for another 5-year term, considering it as a 
provocative m ovem ent. The U.S. diplomats in Albania avoided any public meetings with 
Berisha, further isolating him politically.'^ At the end, under continuous pressures from 
the U.S. and the international community and feeling the ever tightening grip o f  the 
popular uprising, Berisha was forced to accept, in M arch 1997, the formation o f  a broad 
coalition governm ent, headed by a socialist, Bashkim Fino, as well as the organization o f  
early  general elections in the coming summer.
From the beginning, the United States strongly supported the coalition govemment 
and its new Prim e M inister, considering him as their only interlocutor in Albania, 
shunning any contacts w ith Berisha. The U.S. Secretary o f  State M adeleine .Albright in 
particular, took an active interest in the Albanian crisis. In M ay 1997 she invited Prime 
M inister Bashkim Fino for talks in Washington, considering the m eeting a demonstration 
o f  “strong support for the forces o f  moderation and consensus in .Albania.”"'* The 
A lbanian question took a prom inent place in the talks that President Clinton held with
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Italian Prime M inister Rom ano Prodi in Denver, on 20 June 1997. during which Clinton 
thanked Italy for the leadership role it took during the recent crisis in Albania."'
By this time, W ashington was actively involved in helping with the organization o f  
new election, which would take place in June 1997. A high-level delegation headed by 
the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, John Shattuck, was 
sent to Albania to o ffer help and to observe the electoral process. In a special 
announcement, the State D epartm ent considered the sending o f  this delegation as a sign 
o f  the U.S. governm ent’s com m itm ent to the Albanian people, pointing out that ‘the 
situation in Albania is one o f  critical importance for us as well as for our Europen 
partners.”""
As expected, the June 1997 elections resulted in a landslide victory for the Socialist 
party and its allies and a defeat for President Berisha and his Democratic Party. In a sharp 
contrast with its stand on the M ay 1996 elections, W ashington hailed the proceedings o f  
the June 1997 elections, considering them a crucial step toward democracy and economic 
reform in Albania, while, at the same time, expressing its readiness to assist the new 
govemment with the difficult tasks o f  restoring public order and building a sound 
economy."^ Following the form ation o f  the new socialist govem m ent, the United States 
renewed a num ber o f  program s for Albania that had been suspended during the crisis o f  
the spring o f  1997, including cooperation in the m ilitary field. In October 1997, the CIA 
began dispatching personnel to Albania to train and reorganize the secret service, which 
was greatly dam aged during the crisis.
The decisive influence and role o f  the United State in the internal political affairs o f  
Albania was once again m anifested during another serious crisis that the country
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underwent in the autum n o f  1998. On 12 September 1998. unknow n gunm en shot and 
killed a prominent opposition leader. Azem Hajdari. who was a M em ber o f  Parliament 
and a close aide o f  the Dem ocratic Party leader, Berisha. Enraged by this assassination, 
two days later, on 14 Septem ber 1998, during the funeral cerem ony for Hajdari, 
thousands o f  Democratic Party supporters took to the streets o f  the capital, Tirana, and 
attacked govem m ent institutions. For a brief period, they m anaged to take control o f  the 
office o f  the Prime M inister and the State Radio-television station. A coup d ’etat was on 
the verge o f  taking place, w ith unpredictable consequences for the stability  o f  the country 
and the region. The United States was very concemed with these developm ents and was 
quick to react in order to avoid further escalation o f  the situation. The sam e day the State 
Departm ent issued a stem  declaration, condemning in the strongest w ords the actions o f  
the opposition supporters and w arning Berisha bluntly that the U.S. “will not recognize or 
work w ith a govem m ent that com es to power through violent m e a n s .C o n f r o n te d  with 
this condem nation, Berisha ordered his supporters to withdraw from the institutions they 
had previously occupied. The crisis was resolved with the resignation o f  Prim e M inister 
Fatos Nano and his replacem ent w ith a young socialist politician, Pandeli Majko.
The choice o f  Pandeli M ajko, a young politician with no connections to the former 
com m unist regime, was welcom ed by the United States and greeted as “an important 
opportunity for tangible achievem ents on the serious political and econom ic problems 
facing A lbania.”"' With the election o f  Majko as Prime M inister, the pro-.American 
direction o f  Albania was further strengthened, while bilateral relations entered a new 
phase. In February 1999, M ajko was invited to W ashington w here he held talks with 
Secretary o f  State A lbright and other high-ranking officials. This m eeting served to
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reaffirm Am erican determ ination to help A lbania on the path to political stabilization and 
economic developm ent. W ashington gave A lbania $30 million annually in foreign aid to 
stabilize the state budget and encourage trade and private investments. At the same time, 
concem ed for the stability o f  the country, W ashington was constantly calling on the 
opposition Democratic Party and its leader Berisha to renounce any further acts o f  
violence and destabilization and retum to the parliam ent, which that party had boycotted. 
An important role in this direction was played by the special U.S. envoy for the Balkans, 
Frowick, who, after m any attem pts, finally brokered the entry o f  the Democratic Party in 
Parliament.
It must be emphasized that the U.S. support for the socialist govemment o f  Majko, 
(and later for his successor, Ilir Meta), m arks a significant developm ent in U.S. policy 
toward Albania. Contrary to the beginning o f  the democratic processes, when the U.S. 
openly distanced itself from the Albanian Socialists, Am erican policy toward Albania had 
no more partisan bias and W ashington accepted the former comm unists as part o f  the 
political landscape in Albania. This was in accordance w ith the general trend in other 
East European countries, where, by the mid 1990s, the form er comm unist parties, tum ed 
socialist, were partners with W ashington, strongly advocating entry to NATO and other 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, we witness a new orientation in the foreign 
policy o f  A lbania’s Socialist Party, which considered the United States the main strategic 
partner o f  the country, a shift from its past anti-Am erican rhetoric and a pronounced 
orientation towards W estern Europe.
However, it must be stressed that there is another strategic reason for the new love 
affair o f  the United States w ith the .Albanian Socialists. By 1998 Washington became
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preoccupied with the developm ents in Kosova, where there were growing signs o f 
another bloody conflict in the form er Yugoslavia. In view o f  a possible flare up in 
Kosova, A lbania’s stability  and its role in the region once again gained prominence in 
American strategy in the Balkans, entering a new phase in Albanian-.American relations.
5. U.S. Intervention in Kosova and the 
A lbanian Connection
The Kosova conflict, m ore than any other event, dom inated international politics 
during the first ha lf o f  1999. For nearly three months, the alliance undertook intensive air 
strikes against Serbian positions in Kosova and Serbia itself, until finally forcing 
Slobodan M ilosevic to w ithdraw  his forces from Kosova. Seen in retrospect, it is clear 
that NATO’s intervention in K osova w as mainly an Am erican foreign policy initiative. 
Washington was the driving force that rallied allies to undertake the air cam paign against 
Serbia, while, at the sam e tim e, carrying the main military and financial burden o f  the 
operation. M any times during the prolonged air campaign, the Clinton administration 
brushed away any m ention on the part o f  some allies to give up the air cam paign, which 
they thought was ineffective in breaking M ilosevic’s grasp on Kosova.
It is a fact that during the initial stages o f the Yugoslav conflict, W ashington 
somewhat neglected the K osova problem  and the potential o f  a bloody conflict there, 
encouraging, instead, the passive resistance advocated by the K osovar leader, Ibrahim 
Rugova. When the w ar broke out in Bosnia, the Bush adm inistration delivered a warning 
to Milosevic at the end o f  1992, (repeated one year later by the Clinton Administration) 
that he would face unilateral intervention i f  he cracked down on the ethnic Albanians in
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Kosova."*’ But for M ilosevic this threat sounded more like rhetoric than real intention. 
The Serbian leader, who knew that at that tim e W ashington needed his collaboration to 
find a solution for the Bosnian conflict, did not heed these w arnings and further 
intensified his campaign o f  terror against ethnic Albanians in Kosova. In fact, in order to 
win M ilosevic’s support for the signing o f  the Dayton accords, the U.S. excluded 
consideration o f  the Kosova problem  from those negotiations.
.After the signing o f  the Dayton accords, W ashington began to show m ore interest in 
the developm ents in Kosova. The U.S. was the first W estern country to open an 
information center in Pristina, the capital o f  Kosova, in order to follow closely the 
developm ents in the region. The situation changed dram atically in 1998 with the 
emergence o f  the Kosova Liberation Arm y and the growing desperation o f  the Albanian 
population in Kosova with the passive resistance o f  Rugova. After an initial rebuke o f  the 
armed m ovem ent, W ashington shifted strategy and entered into intensive negotiations 
with the Kosova Liberation Arm y and the Serbian authorities, in order to avoid a flare up 
o f  the conflict. U.S. Secretary o f  State A lbright and the experienced diplom at, Richard 
Holbrook, were personally involved in trying to broker an agreem ent betw een the two 
opposing sides by organizing a Peace Conference at Rambouillet, France, in the 
beginning o f  1999. But when a negotiated settlem ent failed to m aterialize because o f  the 
intransigence o f  the Serbian delegation, the U.S. put the blame squarely on M ilosevic and 
threatened a m ilitary campaign. This tim e the warning was real and in M arch 1999 
W ashington, together with its allies, undertook the air campaign, which lasted 78 days 
and finally forced the Serbian arm y out from Kosova. Within days, NATO sent around
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50.000 troops to Kosova (including 20.000 Am ericans) to secure the  province, while the 
United Nations took the civilian adm inistration under control.
There has been a heated debate about U.S. intervention and engagem ent in Kosova. 
Leading American political analysts, such as Henry K issinger and  Brent Scowcroft. 
argued that Kosova was not an A m erican vital interest and that it w as wrong to go there. 
On the other hand, m any in the C linton administration, especially  in the State 
Departm ent, insisted that U.S. intervention, apart from human righ ts concerns, w ould 
prevent a further destabilization in an area that was considered im portant to European 
security and U.S. interests.*^ Seen in retrospect, the defeat o f  M ilosevic in Kosova is 
considered to be the first victory against international terrorism, g iv ing  a strong warning 
to other despots and rogue states. As Ian Cuthbertson predicted before the events o f  
Septem ber 11, “the greatest apparent threat to Am erican national security  appears to lie 
with a rage o f megalomaniac dictators, hunkered down in bunkers, w hose locations range 
from somewhere in the Iraqi desert to the suburbs o f  Belgrade and the  people’s palaces o f  
Pyongyang.”’® For many observers the defeat o f  M ilosevic in K osova was the m ain 
reason that eventually led to his fall from pow er in Serbia, fulfilling a strategic aim o f  
U.S. policy in the Balkans.
It m ust be stressed that N A TO  intervention in Kosova led to fu rther consolidation o f  
pro-A m erican feelings on the part o f  the A lbanian population in K osova and in Albania 
itse lf as well as o f  the pro-A m erican foreign policy o f  Tirana. The U nited  States was seen 
now not only as the protector o f  A lbania but also as the main guarantor that could prevent 
a retum  o f  the Serbian arm y to K osova. In fact, m any in Kosova and A lbania thought that 
only the United States could ensure the future independence o f  K osova. This attitude w as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
best m anifested in the enthusiastic welcom e that the Albanian population in Kosova 
extended to the American soldiers and to President C linton when he visited Kosova in the 
sum m er o f  1999.
In general, the Kosova conflict increased the geopolitical importance o f Albania and 
its role in the Balkans, leading to a further strengthening o f  Albanian-Am erican relations.
a. The Increase in M ilitary Ties 
The conflict in Kosova led to a reconsideration o f  m ilitary collaboration between the 
United States and Albania and to an increase o f  U.S. military presence in the latter 
country. For the first time the U.S. stationed a contingent o f  troops in Albania, while the 
U.S. militai}' was engaged in the construction o f  a num ber o f  strategic projects in Albania 
such as airfields, roads, and ports. During the entire duration o f  the air campaign, the 
Albanian govem m ent handed over control o f  its airspace, ports and m ilitary infrastructure 
to U.S. and NATO commanders."'* M ost planes, which w ere stationed in Italy, flew over 
A lbanian territory for their bom bing m issions against Serbia. The U.S. and NATO did not 
have any problem s with the use o f  Albanian com m unication facilities, as they did with 
countries such as Bulgaria, G reece and M acedonia. The United States sent a squadron o f  
Apache helicopters to Albania, the first tim e that this advanced weapon was sent to the 
Balkan Peninsula. In spite o f  not being used in the war, the presence o f  this contingent on 
A lbanian soil served as psychological pressure against the Serb army. NATO m ilitary 
com m anders used Albanian territory to gather intelligence about Serbian troop 
m ovem ents inside Kosova. M oreover, C lin ton’s National Security Adviser, Samuel 
Berger, revealed after the end o f  the conflict that, in case o f  a failure o f  the air campaign, 
the United States was preparing a m assive invasion o f  Kosova by ground troops, an
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operation which would be based on the use o f  the Albanian territor\ as the m ain 
launching pad.'** After two years o f  closure, the Pentagon reopened the liaison office 
attached to the Albanian m inistry o f  defense while U.S. advisers w ere engaged in helping 
with the reorganization o f  the Albanian army.
b. The Intensification o f  the Political Ties 
The conflict in Kosova led to an intensification o f  the political ties between .Albania 
and the United States. During the days o f  the Kosova conflict, T irana was tumed into a 
center o f  international diplom acy, as m any high-ranking U.S. and VVest-European 
officials visited Albania’s capital in order to press for a solution to the crisis. In fact, the 
collaboration o f the Albanian govem m ent was considered o f  param ount importance to 
the United States in reaching its objectives in Kosova. As the U.S. Ambassador in 
Tirana, Joseph Limprecht, pointed out in an interview with the A lbanian press in October 
1999, “the close ties that the Albanian govem m ent created with the U nited States during 
the crisis in Kosova constituted a strong support for the U.S. policy in the area.” ’’
Thus, due to the concerted efforts o f  Secretary o f  State Albright and Albanian 
officials, the Kosovar delegation accepted the Ram bouillet agreement. This was o f  great 
political importance because the refusal o f  this agreement by the Serb delegation opened 
the way for NATO air strikes. In the afterm ath o f  the armed conflict, the Albanian 
govem m ent has played an important role in trying to quell the tensions within Kosova by 
appealing to the Kosovar political parties to unite and collaborate with the United Nations 
civil administration and NA TO troops in running Kosova. ’’
Because o f  the crucial role played by the United States during the crisis, all the 
Albanian political parties agreed in their assessment o f  the Unites States as the main
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political and strategic ally o f  Albania. During a visit to the United States in 1999, the 
Albanian Prime M inister Pandeli M ajko stressed that "the United States remains our main 
partner not only for the present but also for the vision o f  the future.” ' The sam e stand 
was also affirmed by the main opposition Democratic Party and its leader Sali Berisha. 
During the proceedings o f  the National Council o f  this party in the sum m er o f  1999. it 
w as stated that "the relations w ith the United States constitute our first priority.” 
considering the presence o f  the U.S. military in Albania and Kosova "o f  the utmost 
im portance.” "^*
c. The Humanitarian Role 
During the Kosova crisis, A lbania bore the main burden o f  the K osovar refugees, who 
were forced to leave their hom es because o f the Serb offensive. In fact, nearly 500,000 
Kosovars, or 75% o f  all the refugees, found shelter in Albania. For com parison, fewer 
than 200,000 refugees w ent to M acedonia and 50,000 to M ontenegro. The treatm ent o f 
the refugees was m uch better in Albania than in the other neighboring countries, which 
tried first to prevent the exodus o f  the refugees there and then to expel them. To some 
extent, this was understandable, since all the refugees were o f  Albanian nationality.
It must be noted that the readiness o f  the A lbanian govem m ent to receive and 
accom modate hundreds o f  thousands o f  refugees greatly helped the United States and 
N ATO in performing their m ilitary mission in Kosova. President Clinton acknowledged 
this important role o f  Albania. In a m essage sent to the Albanian govem m ent and people 
after the successful conclusion o f  the operation in Kosova, Clinton pointed out “no 
country bore a greater burden than Albania, and no nation did more to help hum anity 
prevail.”"
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In general, it can be said that the U.S. intervention in Kosova had a double impact on 
the fu ture o f  Albanian-American relations. O n the one hand it strengthened the pro- 
A m erican orientation o f  Albania and its political establishment. O n the other, this 
in tervention confirm ed a pro-Albanian shift in U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans, with the 
U.S. now  considering Albania and K osova as tw o important allies in this troubled region.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FUTURE
1. A New Role for the U nited States in the Balkans
With the break up o f  Yugoslavia and the wars that followed, the United States 
becam e strongly engaged, militarily, politically and diplom atically in the Balkans. For 
m uch o f  the Cold War, the Balkans was considered to be an area outside the U.S. 
strategic interests, sim ply a backyard o f  Europe. For m any years, U.S. involvement in the 
Balkans was m ainly confined to the efforts to find a solution for the Cyprus problem and 
the territorial disputes between Turkey and G reece, two U.S. allies. This situation 
changed dram atically during the last decade o f  the 20'^ century, which coincided with the 
end o f  the Cold W ar and the break up o f  Yugoslavia. At the beginning, when the wars 
broke out in Croatia and Bosnia, W ashington adopted a passive attitude, considering the 
Yugoslav conflict as Europe’s problem. But after three years o f  bloody wars and the loss 
o f  the lives o f  a quarter million people, the w orst conflict in Europe since the Second 
W orld War, the United States took m ilitary and diplom atic initiatives, rallying NATO to 
act in Bosnia and im posing the Dayton accords, w hich ended the bloody conflicts in the 
form er Yugoslavia. This led to a new U.S. m ilitary engagem ent in the Balkans, with 
W ashington sending m ore than 8,000 troops to Bosnia, the bulk o f  the peacekeeping 
forces.
67
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The second m ajor involvement o f  the United States in the Balkans during the 1990s 
was som e years later in Kosova. A fter months o f  hesitation and a failed attempt to find a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, W ashington orchestrated another N.A.TO air campaign 
against Serbia, which was more intensive and prolonged than during the Bosnian conflict. 
And again, thousands o f  U.S. solders were sent to guarantee the security and borders o f  
another Balkan province, Koso\ a.
The th ird  case o f  American involvement during the 1990s in a Balkan countrv^ was in 
the form er Yugoslav Republic o f  M acedonia. Fearing a spread o f war in this republic, 
during the m id 1990s the U.S. sent a preventive force o f  300 troops, w ithin the 
fram ew ork o f  the United Nations M ission, but under the command o f  U.S. officers.
W hen arm ed clashes between the M acedonian arm y and the Albanian m inority broke out 
last year (2001), after some initial hesitation, the Bush adm inistration was politically 
involved in the conflict, sending a high-ranking diplom at who played a m ajor role in 
brokering an agreement that stopped the fighting.
All these developm ents marked a significant change in U.S. policy towards the 
Balkans, affirm ing a new status for the United States in the post-Cold W ar era.
First o f  all, U.S. intervention in the Balkans, particularly  in Kosova, confirmed the 
indispensable role o f  the United States in world affairs, including the Balkans. For m any 
analysts, the relatively successful resolution o f  the arm ed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosova 
would have been impossible without the engagem ent o f  the United States. "The Kosova 
crisis,’ w rites Elisabeth Pond, “clarified the evolution that began the m om ent the Berlin 
Wall fell but was dim ly perceived in the m id-1990s, the status o f  the United States as the 
sole rem aining superpower.” '
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Second, the Kosova conflict confirmed the fall o f  Russia from the status o f  
superpower. A lthough it expressed a strong opposition to N A TO ’s air strikes. Moscow 
was not in a position to pose any serious challenge to this campaign. . \s  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski has put it, more than supporting the Serbs, M oscow ’s traditional allies in the 
Balkans, Russian opposition to the N.A.TO air cam paign in Kosova, “was driven by- 
nostalgia for global power status and by resentm ent against A m erica’s special 
international standing.”* In the final analysis R ussia agreed to participate in 
peacekeeping, but her role by now was a secondary one. This was one example indicating 
the end o f  bipolarity.
Third, U.S. interv entions in Bosnia and K osova revealed the huge military gap 
between the United States and its European allies. Ever since the Clinton administration 
engaged the United Sates in the Dayton process, the Europeans have known that without 
the backing o f  the United States they would have been helpless in resolving a conflict in 
their backyard. This is why they contem plated no m ajor m ove in the region without U.S. 
participation. As form er U.S. ambassador to N A TO  Robert Hunt has put it, “Kosova and 
A m erica’s involvem ent in the Balkans tested the continuation o f  Europe’s security on the 
United States. This heralds a long U.S. m ilitary presence in the Balkans.”^
The recent events in the Balkans, while reaffirm ing the leadership role o f  
W ashington, heralded an increasing importance o f  the Balkans in the global strategy o f  
the United States. There are a num ber o f  reasons for this.
First, there is the geo-political argument. D espite m any changes in the international 
arena, geopolitics, as the realist theory o f  international relations acknowledges, still has a 
strong influence in guiding the foreign policy o f  nation states. Thus, after NATO’s
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intervention in Kosova, a num ber o f  analysts and human rights organizations criticized 
the C linton adm inistration for not acting in Rwanda, Sierra Leone or East Timor, where 
the victim s o f  genocide and human rights abuses were m uch higher than in Kosova. The 
answer to this criticism is simple: geo-politics. Kosova was a crisis at the edge o f  Europe 
and Europe has a much higher priority for American interests than Africa or the Far East. 
Despite m uch talk o f  a Pacific shift, A m erica’s foreign policy remains Euro-centric. 
A ccording to a survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Europe ranked 
ahead o f  A sia as an Am erican foreign policy priority, 42%  to 28%  o f those interviewed."* 
The United States still devotes roughly h a lf o f  its enorm ous m ilitary budget to the 
defense o f  Europe, while the bilateral trade is S I .3 trillion annually. This is an important 
Am erican investm ent in Europe that cannot be wasted aw ay because o f  any regional 
conflict in the Balkans, which has the potential to spread throughout the continent.
Second, there is the historical argum ent. It was precisely in the Balkans that the First 
W orld W ar started with the assassination o f  the Austrian A rchduke Franz Ferdinand in 
the streets o f  Sarajevo. This is an important fact that cannot be neglected. And as the 
theory o f  international relations explains, experience has a strong influence in 
form ulating policy. There is no doubt that the curse o f  the First W orld W ar has played a 
significant role in W ashington’s decisions to intervene in B osnia and Kosova and prevent 
an escalation o f  the conflict.
D espite the silence o f  weapons in the Balkans and a certain progress in the political 
settlem ents o f  the conflicts, the situation in the region is far from stable and the old inter­
ethnic and inter-state quarrels are far from being resolved. As m any observers agree, 
achieving the goals o f  peace and stability in the Balkans, especially in the long run, is
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likely to prove m ore elusive and complex than stopping the fighting. Here once more. 
U.S. presence and U.S. leadership will be crucial for the future.
At present, U.S. diplom acy and the international com m unity are presented with a 
num ber o f  crucial challenges in the Balkans
a. The Future o f  Bosnia as a Single Entitv 
There is growing concern in Washington and international circles that the future o f  
Bosnia as a single m ultiethnic state is in doubt. W hile the election o f  the reform ist 
president. Stipe Mesic in C roatia (who succeeded the nationalist Franjo Tudjm an) was 
good news for W ashington, the results o f  the local elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
w hich showed considerable gains for the nationalist parties, w as surely bad news for the 
United States and the W est as well as an obstacle for the consolidation o f  the m ultiethnic 
bases o f  a single state. There are still thousands o f  NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia, 
including Americans, and there isn’t yet a set date for their w ithdraw al. M eanwhile, 
nearly seven years after the end o f  the war and the signing o f  the Dayton Accords, Bosnia 
is still administered by an international representative, who m akes the key decisions for 
the country.
b. The Future o f  Kosova 
There is no doubt that the future status o f  Kosova presents one o f  the most intriguing 
problem s that will confront U.S. diplomacy and the international com m unity in the 
Balkans for a long time. Officially, Washington continues to support the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council resolution for the settlem ent o f  the conflict, which considers 
Kosova as part o f  Serbia. However, the United States has m ade it clear that there will be 
no return to the former status o f  Kosova. W ashington’s unofficial stand has wavered from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
independence to a sort o f  loose confederation w ith Serbia and M ontenegro. For the 
m oment. Kosova continues to be a sort o f  UN protectorate, with NATO ensuring its 
security, w ithout a clear vision o f  its future political status. The United States still 
m aintains 5,000 troops in Kosova, more than any o f  the 38 other countries participating 
in the NATO operation. Here, as in the case o f  Bosnia, dispite some planned reductions, 
there is no indication o f  an early U.S. m ilitary withdrawal.
c. The Future o f  M ontenegro and Its Links with Serbia 
This is another big headache for the United States in the Balkans. As long as 
M ilosevic was in power, the official policy in W ashington was to isolate Serbia, back the 
opposition, and encourage M ontenegro to take an independent path, while trying to force 
M ilosevic out o f  power. The election o f  K ostunica as president and the exit o f  M ilosevic 
from the political scene was an important victory for American diplom acy in the Balkans. 
At the same tim e, the United States was confronted w ith a new and more complicated 
situation concerning the future o f  the so-called Y ugoslav federation and the links o f  
Serbia with M ontenegro. The fact is that K ostunica, although considered a democrat, is as 
nationalist as M ilosevic. He strongly opposed N A T O ’s bom bardm ent in Kosova as well 
as U.S. involvem ent in the Balkans. The recent agreem ent to form a sort o f  loose 
Confederation between Serbia and M ontenegro seem s to  be a hasty solution o f  the 
m om ent, reached under strong pressure from the International Community, mainly the 
European Union. Given the huge differences in territories and populations as well as the 
traditional nationalist tendencies and am bitions o f  the Serbs, it is impossible to envision 
that a new confederation could function on an equal footing. Under these conditions, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
/-■>
possibility o f  M ontenegro seeking independence would always be present, adding 
another hot spot in the Balkans.
All these questions, together with the still uncertain future o f  M acedonia and the 
never-ending problem o f  Cyprus and G reek-Turkish quarrels, pose serious problem s for 
the future. At the beginning o f  the 2C ‘ century, m ost o f  the small Balkan countries seem 
to be in the process o f  nation building, while still nourishing territorial am bitions toward 
each other. This gives the Balkans the form er geo-strategic importance and m akes this 
region the m ost destabilized area in Europe, which directly affects U.S. interests on the 
old continent. All this will require an active m ilitary, diplomatic and economic 
engagem ent o f  the U.S. in the Balkans, confronting W ashington with real challenges and 
responsibilities in the area. As former Secretary o f  State M adeleine Albright put it, “ if  the 
tower o f  dem ocracy is really to rise above all o f  Southeast Europe, we must be prepared 
to devote substantial efforts and resources to the region over a substantial period o f 
tim e.”'
It is true that after the events o f  11 Septem ber 2001, with the new focus on the war 
against international terrorism, the Balkans seem s to have lost some o f  its im portance in 
the global strategy o f  the United States. However, to ignore the dangers that m ight come 
from the Balkans, for the sake o f  another m ajor objective, would be a grave m istake for 
any Am erican administration. M oreover, the Balkans, with its chronic instabilities and 
interstate rivalries, represents a possible hot bed for the spread o f  terrorist activities. That 
is w hy stabilizing the Balkans is also part o f  the fight against global terrorism, which will 
confront the United States for a long time. The importance o f  the Balkans, which, in 
some ways, was underestim ated at the beginning o f  the new Bush administration, seems
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to have been underlined again in W ashington. In an apparent retreat from the former 
positions when there was talk o f  an early withdrawal o f  A m erican troops from the 
Balkans, the Bush adm inistration has affirmed now that U.S. troops will remain in the 
Balkans for as long as needed, and that they will w ithdraw from the area at the same time 
as the other NATO forces. In the final analysis, as the tragic events o f  the 1990s proved. 
Europe, despite m uch talk o f  its ambitions to become a world pow er and to assume a 
greater role in the European security, is unable to resolve the Balkan conundrum. .A.s a 
consequence, any retreat or disengagement o f  the United Stated form the area will prove 
to be fatal for the future. As D avid Fromin writes, only “the United States and NATO at 
the end o f  the 20'*’ century can be the holder o f  the balance in the Balkans, as England 
was the Balancer in the 19'*’ century.”*’
It must be stressed that this new role o f  the United States in the Balkans cannot be 
realized without the establishm ent o f  close ties and collaboration w ith the individual 
countries o f the region. In this context, o f  special im portance are the relations with 
Albania, which, as argued in this study, more than any other country in the region, is 
affected by the developm ents in the Balkans.
2. The Albanian National Question and the Implications 
for U.S. -  Albanian Relations 
Ever since Albania gained independence in 1912, the issue o f  Kosova and other 
predom inantly ,\lbanian-inhabited  territories that were incorporated into former 
Yugoslavia has been a focus o f  contention in the Balkans that has drawn the attention and 
intervention o f  the international community. In no other country o f  Eastern Europe has a
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national schism been so tragic as in the case o f  Albania. It is rare to find a country, like 
Albania, which has lost ha lf o f  its territory and population as a result o f  treaties put 
together by the big powers, and where m ore indigenous people live outside than inside 
the m other country. For com parison, Hungary, which among the East European countries 
has the highest external m inority, the figure is only 25 % o f  the population, .\lb an ia  can 
be considered the only country in Europe that has not resolved its national problem . 
Although m ost Albanians w ere never content with the national separation, during the 
Cold W ar the comm unist regim e in Albania, for various reasons, w as forced to acquiesce 
to the status quo and never raised this question.
The end o f  the Cold W ar and the dem ise o f  communism, contrary  to the hopes o f  
many Albanians, were not followed by the resolution o f the national problem . On the 
contrary, this problem becam e m ore complex in the wake o f  the collapse o f  the Yugoslav 
federation, when Albanians in Kosova were separated from their kin in M acedonia by a 
new international border. The Kosova crisis has raised, for the first tim e at the beginning 
o f  this century, the Albanian question, whose solution is considered to  be crucial for the 
future stability o f  the Balkans. In fact m any observers believe that the Kosova problem  
and the Albanian question in general could present a greater and longer-term  threat to 
peace and stability in the Balkans than Bosnia.** All the indications are that in the future 
the salience o f  the Albanian national question is likely to increase. There are a num ber o f  
reasons for this.
a. The Kosova Conundrum 
After the tragic events in Kosova, it is alm ost impossible to foresee a future Kosova 
under the governance o f  Serbia o r in any sort o f  federation with it. A ny talk o f  such a
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move w ould  certainly spark a new war in the province. In fact, all the Albanian political 
parties in Kosova have declared as their main political objective the independence o f  the 
province.^ This is unacceptable for the international community, which support the 
resolution o f  the United Nations that calls for an autonom ous Kosova as part o f  Serbia. 
H ow ever, as K osova continues to be adm inistered by  the United Nations, with NATO 
guaranteeing its security, this situation, in the long run, would be unacceptable for both 
the .Albanians and the Serbs. And while a new  reunion o f  Kosova with Serbia seems 
im possible in any circum stances, many analysts agree that an independent Kosova will be 
the prelude o f  a union with Albania, leading to a G reater Albania.
b. The Fragilitv o f  M acedonia 
This constitutes another hotbed in the Balkans that is directly linked with the 
Albanian question. Although the danger o f  a large-scale conflict for the moment seem s 
remote, the  seeds o f  the inter-ethnic conflict are alw ays present. In fact, the armed clashes 
that took place in 2001 have further shaken the already delicate co-existence between the 
M acedonians and the m inority Albanians. W hile the Albanians have always resented the 
political and  m ilitary m onopoly o f  the M acedonians over the country, the latter fear that 
an extension o f  self-government rights to the predom inantly  Albanian populated areas, 
m ay further inflame the separatist tendencies.
c. The Increasing A lbanian Element in Greece 
This is a new developm ent in the political landscape o f  the Balkans. After the fall o f  
com m unism , between 400,000 and 500,000 A lbanians have immigrated to Greece in 
search o f  a  better life. This constitutes a considerable num ber o f  foreigners for Greece, a 
country o f  10 m illion people, and the Albanians now  com prise the largest group o f
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immigrants. M any o f  them  have immigrated with their fam ilies, with a potential for 
staying perm anently and further adding to the numbers. Along with the new immigrants, 
in some areas o f  G reece there exists an indigenous population o f  Albanians, called 
Arvanitas, who have kept their language. M eanwhile som e nationalist circles in .A.lbania 
consider vast areas in N orthern Greece, formerly inhabited by Cami (an Albanian 
population that was deported from Greece early last century) as part o f the old Great 
Albania. In fact, som e nationalist circles in Greece have seen the ever-increasing 
presence o f  A lbanians in Greece as a new threat for Hellenism , while giving rise to fears 
o f  a Greater Albania. A t the same time, the presence o f  a G reek minority in A lbania and 
the claims o f  som e nationalist circles in Greece for the areas inhabited by this minority, 
which they still call Vorio Epirus, tend to make the national question in the Balkans more 
acute.
d. The Demographic Explosion
It is envisioned that, given the current demographic trends, in a not so distant future, 
the Albanians will becom e the third largest ethnicity in the B alkans.’** The Albanians 
constitute the youngest population in the Balkans and the birth rates o f  the Albanians, 
both in Albania and K osova, are the highest in Europe. M any in Serbia fear that in an 
eventual incorporation o f  Kosova with Serbia, in a couple o f  decades, the Albanians 
m ight surpass the Serbs. The same can be said about M acedonia, where the Albanians, 
who now comprise 1/3 o f  the population o f  the country, m ay acquire the status o f  the 
majority, making the M acedonians a minority.
All these developm ents will make the Albanian national question more visible in the 
future, while putting further pressure on the international com m unity to find a viable
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solution to this problem . In this context, the United States policy in the Balkans and its 
relations with A lbania would be crucial. At present the official American policy, like that 
o f  the other W est European countries, is to repudiate any thought o f  a G reater .Albania.” 
The U.S. fears that this tendency m ay encourage claims o f  other nations in the Balkans 
for a bigger Serbia or bigger Croatia. Nevertheless, there are som e different nuances in 
the stand o f  the United States and its European partners when it comes to the problem o f 
Kosova and the A lbanian question in general. W ashington, from time to tim e, has flirted 
with the idea o f  an independent Kosova, something that has caused concern among the 
European allies.'" A lthough officially this idea is denied, it remains a potential alternative 
o f  the U.S. policy in the Balkans. The United States was the m ain force that drove the 
Serbs out o f  Kosova and it has been m ore consistent than the European allies in opposing 
any attempts o f  the Serbian adm inistration to return in Kosova. All these facts are greatly 
resented in Belgrade, giving rise to strong anti-American feelings among the Serbian 
population. In fact, since the begirming o f  the Balkan crisis, some observers have noticed 
a tendency o f  A lbanophilia and Serbophobia in the U.S. policy in the B alkans.'' Some 
analysts have gone even further in foreseeing a new realignm ent o f  forces in the Balkans, 
with the formation o f  an axis between the United States, Turkey and Albania to counter 
the other axis o f  Serbia, Greece and M acedonia that tends to be linked with Russia.
W hatever truth lies behind these scenarios, it is clear that the solution o f  the future 
status o f  Kosova will surely require the involvement o f  the American diplom acy. The 
European powers, as the recent events in Macedonia proved once more, are unable to 
solve this problem without American leadership. At the same time, any solution o f  this 
problem cannot be achieved without the participation o f  Albania, which is directly
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affected by the course o f  events in K osova and M acedonia. This is another important area 
o f  cooperation between the United States and Albania, w hose services are indispensable 
for W ashington. In the final analysis, both  a  stable K osova and a stable A lbania are vital 
for realizing the American strategic goal for a Southeast Europe that is dem ocratic, 
prosperous and fully integrated into a  unified and indivisible Europe.
3. The S tability  Pact for the Balkans 
A nd the Role o f  A lbania 
O ne o f  the major components o f  the U.S. policy in the Balkans is the so-called 
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. This Pact, w hich is m ainly an Am erican initiative, 
was officially launched at the Sarajevo Sum m it at the end o f  July 1999. Under the Pact, 
m ore than 40 countries and international organizations have formed a partnership to 
advance needed economic and political reform s in a region that is considered the least 
developed and stabilized in Europe. U nlike the Dayton Accords, which w ere confined to 
the form er Yugoslavia alone, the S tability  Pact includes all the Balkan countries, that is, 
A lbania, Bulgaria, Croatia, M acedonia, Rom ania, M ontenegro and Serbia (after the fall 
o f  M ilosevic). M any compare this in itiative with the M arshall Plan that helped to rebuild 
Europe im m ediately after the end o f  the Second W orld W ar.
The Stability Pact, which is confined to a smaller geographic area, has the same 
objectives, that is, the economic and dem ocratic rebuilding o f  the Balkan countries in 
order to prepare them for future integration within the Transatlantic and European 
institutions. This is in accordance w ith  the U.S. foreign policy  objective o f  creating a 
unified and stable Europe, an aim that was reaffirmed by  president C linton at the
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Sarajevo Summit. “* Although the European Union will bear the m ain economic burden 
o f  the Pact, the United States will play a m ajor role in its im plem entation, a task that is 
going to keep W ashington actively engaged in Balkan affairs.
The Stability Pact has three main directions;
a. The W orking Table on Dem ocratization 
and Human Rights
This will address the rights o f  national minorities, the problem s o f  refugees and 
displaced persons, the strengthening o f  the civil society and dem ocratic institutions, and 
the independence o f  the media. This is an important objective given the com plexity o f  the 
problem o f m inorities in the Balkans and the deficiencies in the dem ocratic processes.
The OSCE has been given a leading role in implem enting these objectives.
b. The W orking Table on Economic Reconstruction,
Development and Cooperation
This table will work to enhance economic cooperation am ong the countries o f  the 
region and with the European Union, prom ote free flow o f  goods and capital, improve 
regional infrastructure and support privatization and m arket-oriented reforms. An 
important objective in this field is the creation o f a pan-Balkan custom s union and an 
integrated network o f  transportation, in order to increase inter-regional trade and 
exchanges. At present, com m ercial relations among the Balkan states represent only 5% 
o f  their foreign trade. The European Union is supposed to play the leading role in this 
table.
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c. The W orking Table on Security and Defense 
This table will work toward ending inter state tensions, creating good neighborly 
relations and a clim ate o f  security throughout the region. It will seek full implementation 
o f  existing arm s control and confidence building m easures, will fight terrorism and illegal 
trafficking, and strengthen civilian control o f  the arm ed forces. A main objective is the 
military reform  and the preparation o f  these countries for their future integration into the 
Atlantic A lliance. It is understood that NATO and the U.S. will play an important role in 
this area.
The U nited States has taken several im portant steps to support the Stability Pact 
objectives for prom oting democracy, regional stability  and cooperation in the Balkans. 
Immediately after the launching o f  the Pact, in Novem ber 1999 the U.S. administration 
proposed the creation o f  the “Southeast Europe Trade Preference Act,” which extends 
duty-free treatm ent for a num ber o f  products from the Balkan countries. At the same 
time, the O versees Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC) is engaged in financing a 
number o f  projects in the region, while facilitating U.S. investments there. It has opened a 
S200-million line o f  credit for U.S. investment in Southeast Europe. In July 2000, OPIC 
and the Soros Foundation launched the Southeast Europe Equity Fund, a S I 50 m illion 
fund to provide new business development, expansion and privatization in the region.'"
It is estimated that only for the year 2000, the am ount o f  U.S. assistance to the region has 
been more than $600 million.'*’
The United States is especially active in supporting the Stability Pact’s objectives for 
promoting security  and stability in the region. W ashington is a main participant in the 
Southeastern Europe Defense M inisterial process, which brings together four NATO
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allies (the United States, G reece, Italy and Turkey) and five Balkan partners (Albania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Rom ania and Slovenia) to cooperate on a variety o f  security related 
issues in the region. In N ovem ber 1999 the Balkan countries adopted a jo in t initiative 
proposed by the United States to secure and safely destroy illegal small arms and light 
weapons. A U.S.- Norway jo in t working group was established to develop an action plan 
and a schedule for the destruction o f  these weapons. At the sam e time the United States is 
engaged in a num ber o f  bilateral m ilitary agreements with the countries o f  the region in 
supporting their efforts to reform  their defense establishments in a m anner consistent with 
the Stability Pact objectives.
For its part, Albania has strongly supported the idea o f  the Stability Pact, declaring its 
willingness and comm itm ent to contribute to its implem entation. It has actively 
participated in regional m eetings and projects in the framework o f  the P a c t. '' At the same 
time, Tirana sees this Pact as an opportunity to further strengthen its ties with the United 
States. In fact, there are a num ber o f  projects that the United States has undertaken in 
Albania in the framework o f  the Stability Pact. For example, W ashington is actively 
supporting and financing a UN project to gather and destroy hundreds o f  thousands o f 
illegal weapons, which were looted by civilians from the army depots during the unrest o f  
1997.This is an acute problem  and a source o f  instability in Albania. M eanwhile, the 
Oversees Private Investment C orporation and the United States A gency for International 
Developm ent (USAID) are also engaged in promoting U.S. investm ents in Albania, 
supporting the process o f  privatization and the expansion o f  sm all businesses. 
W ashington’s support was decisive in obtaining A lbania’s m em bership in the World 
Trade Organization last year. A lbania, w ith its mineral riches such as oil, copper and
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chrom ium  (it ranked third in the w orld for the production o f  chromium during the 
com m unist period) offers som e good opportunities for Am erican com panies.”' A l the 
sam e tim e, the United States has taken a leading role, w ithin the fram ework o f  the 
S tability Pact, in helping to reform  the Albanian arm y and prom ote confidence building 
m easures and good relations w ith its neighbors. In this framework. W ashington has 
encouraged a num ber o f trilateral m inisterial m eetings and agreements betw een Albania. 
M acedonia, and Greece for the easing o f  tensions and border cooperation.
An important project for A lbania w ithin the Stability Pact and one o f  the m ajor 
investm ents o f  the United States in the region is the so-called Corridor 8. a trade route 
that will run through three countries, A lbania. M acedonia and Bulgaria. This route will 
connect the Albanian ports o f  D uress and Vlora on the Adriatic Sea with the Bulgarian 
ports o f  V arna and Burgas on the Black Sea. It is envisaged that this Corridor will be 
extended to Italy, linking the A lbanian ports o f  Durres and Vlora with the Italian ports o f 
Bari and Brindizi on the other side o f  the Adriatic. C orridor 8, which will include 
highw ays, railways, oil pipelines, and fiber-optic telecom m unications, is considered to be 
one o f  the m ajor trade routes in Southeastern Europe that will greatly increase regional 
integration and East-W est trade.'** The Am erican governm ent has taken a particular 
interest in this project, which was personally launched by  President Clinton in 1996 and 
w as included in the Stability Pact since its beginning. The American Agency for Trade 
and Developm ent (TDA) has given a grant o f  $30 m illion to the participating countries 
for the initial stage o f  the project.’" The choice o f  the ports o f  Durres and Vlora as the 
gatew ays to this Corridor, som ething that is supported by the Am erican governm ent, 
besides the economic benefits, will greatly  enhance the geo-strategic position o f  Albania.
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At the sam e time, the possibility o f  adding a new segment to this Corridor that will link 
T irana with Pristina, the capital o f  Kosova, will help the efforts o f  the international 
com m unity to rebuild the province.
A m ajor component o f  C orridor 8 is a plan to build a trans-Balkan pipeline, which 
will pass from Burgas, Bulgaria, in the Black Sea to the port o f  Vlora, Albania, in the 
Adriatic Sea. This pipeline, which will cost S I .3 billion, will ship crude oil from the rich 
areas o f  the Black and Caspian Seas to the markets o f  W estern Europe and North 
Am erica. It will bypass Turkey’s heavily traveled Bosphorus Strait, making the transit 
jou rney  to the United States m ore econom ical. An American Com pany, Balkan Ambo, 
has undertaken the construction o f  this pipeline, which is expected to be completed in 
2005. According to Ted Ferguson, the president o f this com pany, the underground 
pipeline is designed to carry 750,000 barrels a day, which will represent 40% o f  the crude 
oil from the newly developed oilfields that would enter the Black Sea in the next five 
years."'
It m ust be said that the Stability Pact in general and Corridor 8 in particular, will 
increase the geopolitical im portance o f  Albania, creating at the sam e time new 
possibilities for the further strengthening o f  Albania’s relations w ith  the United States, a 
m ajor supporter and contributor to the Stability Pact.
4. Albania -  A U.S. Ally in the War against Terrorism
Septem ber 11, 2001, marks a landm ark in the course o f  international relations. The 
tragic events o f  that day changed dram atically the configuration o f  Am erican foreign 
policy, while the war against international terrorism has em erged as the number one
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priority. In this framework, such areas as Asia and the M iddle East have become the main 
focus o f  Am erican foreign policy, while the attitude towards terrorism  is considered a 
new yardstick for W ashington to build new coalitions and judge its allies and enemies. 
“The axis o f  evil” has becam e the new leitm otif o f  .American foreign policy as the “the 
empire o f  evil” used to be at the height o f  the Cold War.
It is true that, as argued above, the priority given to the fight against terrorism has 
som ewhat overshadowed the concerns over the Balkans, w hich dom inated American 
foreign policy during the 1990s. However, while engaging in this new endeavor, it would 
be a grave m istake for Am erican strategists to underestim ate the continuous dangers that 
could em erge from the Balkans, including that o f  terrorism. In fact, the Balkans has m any 
elem ents that can m ake it a potential hot bed o f  terrorism.
First o f  all, the instability o f  the region, fueled by the old ethnic rivalries and the still 
uncertain futures for Kosova, Bosnia and M ontenegro, as well as the deficiencies in the 
process o f  dem ocratization, m akes the Balkans a potential terrain for terrorist activities 
that can directly  affect the U.S. presence and interests in the area. There have been 
various reports o f  terrorist plots to attack U.S. embassies and other installations in a 
num ber o f  countries in the region, such as Bosnia, A lbania and M acedonia.
Second, the Balkans represents the only area in Europe where we find a Muslim 
population. Besides Turkey, M uslim s make up the m ajority o f  the population in Albania 
and Kosova and also the largest com m unity in Bosnia. Although the M uslim population 
in the Balkans is known for its religious tolerance and coexistence with other faiths, the 
recent wars in the form er Y ugoslavia had m any elem ents o f  a religious conflict, while 
there have been m any acts o f  sym pathy and solidarity o f  extrem ist Islamic groups with
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the cause o f  the M uslims in the Balkans. Thus, it is known that during the war in Bosnia, 
hundreds o f  Islamic volunteers, called M ujahedins, fought by the side o f  their religious 
brothers, the Bosnians. W ith the end o f  the war, som e o f these fighters were allowed by 
the Bosnian governm ent to rem ain in the country, a move that after Septem ber 11 has 
rekindled the fears o f  potential terrorist activities in the area. In fact, a num ber o f  persons 
linked with Islamic m ilitant groups w ere arrested in Bosnia in October 2001, including 
two foreigners."'
Third, the strategic position o f  the Balkans as a link between Asia and Europe has 
turned this area into a transit route for various illegal activities that help international 
terrorism. It is known that m any Islamic terrorists have used the Balkan countries as a 
gateway to the West, w here they have organized various terrorist cells. At the sam e time, 
the Balkans has served as a main passage for the trafficking o f drugs from Asia to the 
W est, a main source for financing the activities o f  the terrorist groups. According to Ray 
Kendall, former General Secretary o f  Interpol, about 80% o f the heroine (the main source 
o f  income for Taliban) that enters W estern Europe passes through Turkey and the 
Balkans."’
It is for all these reasons that the Balkans should represent a potential target for the 
U.S.-led coalition in its w ar against international terrorism. In this fram ework, o f  special 
importance are the relations o f  the United States with Albania, which, for various 
reasons, represents both a problem  and an asset in U.S. efforts against terrorism.
The fact is that Albania, with its chronic instability, weak government authority, and 
widespread corruption as well as its favorable geographic position at the entrance o f  the 
M editerranean, has been a favorable terrain for illegal and criminal activities. The
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Albanian ports o f  Vlora and Durres in the Adriatic are considered to be a m ain transit 
route for the trafficking o f  people and drugs from Asia and Eastern Europe to the West. 
A ccording to a seminar organized in M arseille, A lbania is topping the list o f  the 
countries, along with M orocco, serving as a springboard for the drug trafficking network 
in W estern countries.’^
This situation has been a lure for various terrorist groups, which have tried to create a 
foothold in Albania. Thus, after the fall o f  com m unism , at the beginning o f  the 1990s, 
under the m ask o f  religious activities or aid program s, various Islamic elem ents from the 
M iddle East began to set up cells in Albania. The increasing presence o f  these Islamic 
organizations in Albania began to draw  the attention o f  the American governm ent, which 
at that time was involved in the conflicts in the Balkans. By this tim e a close 
collaboration was established between the CIA and its counterpart in A lbania, the 
National Intelligence Service. Am erican agents w ere engaged in the training o f  the 
A lbanian officers in the tracking and apprehending o f  potential foreign terrorists that 
m ight operate in Albania. In August 1998, this collaboration led to the uncovering and 
foiling o f  a plot by an Islamic group in A lbania to attack the U.S. em bassy in Tirana, 
sim ilar to the attacks against U.S. m issions in Kenya and Tanzania. This led to the 
tem porary closure o f the American em bassy in Tirana, and a M arines unit was sent to 
provide security to the embassy com pound."' Follow ing this plot, a jo in t operation o f 
CIA and A lbania’s Intelligence Service led to the arrest and the expulsion from Albania 
o f  a num ber o f  suspected Islamic terrorists, w orking in the country under various 
d isguises.'"
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The events o f  September 11 led to renew ed efforts and collaboration betw een the 
Am erican and Albanian authorities in order to thwart any possible terrorist attacks against 
Am erican interests in Albania. Follow ing the Septem ber 11 attacks, the Albanian 
parliam ent approved a special resolution expressing the full support o f  the country for the 
United States in its fight against terrorism. The document stated that A lbania was ready 
to put its airfields and seaports at the disposal o f  the United States if  needed, to fight 
terrorism." The Albanian governm ent fully supported the U.S. m ilitary operation in 
Afghanistan. Prim e Minister Ilir M eta declared that Albania considered itse lf part o f  the 
U.S.-led world coalition against terrorism. Responding to the call o f  President Bush, the 
Albanian authorities took im m ediate m easures to block a number o f  bank accounts in 
Tirana, which w ere thought to belong to A l-Qaida. W ith the help o f  the CIA, more than 
tw enty Islamists, suspected as terrorists, w ere deported from Albania following 
Septem ber 11 ."*
M eanwhile, the United States has identified two armed groups, the National Albanian 
Arm y (AKSH) and the so-called National Com m ittee for the Liberation and Protection o f  
the Albanian Lands (KKCM TSH), operating in Macedonia and Southern Serbia, as 
terrorist organizations and has moved to block their bank accounts and deny entrance to 
the United States to their members."**
It is for all these reasons that Albania, with its pro-American policy, its geo-strategic 
position, and its links with Kosova and M acedonia could represent a close and reliable 
ally for the United States in its war against international terrorism, thus adding an 
important elem ent for the future collaboration betw een the two countries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
S9
Endnotes
' Elisabeth Pond. “ Kosova: Catalyst for Europe.” The W ashington Ouarterlv 22 
(Autum n 1999): 92
■ Zbigniew Brzezinski. Testim ony to the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee on 
Kosova, 6 October 1999. ww w.w hitehouse.gov/W H/1999 0921/html
■ Quoted in Gary T. Dem psey, “W ashington’s Kosova Policy: Consequences and 
Contradictions,” Policv Analvsis no. 321 (8 October 1998): 8.
Peter Rodman, “The Fallout from Kosova.” Foreign Affairs 78 (July/August 1999):
46.
■ M adeleine Albright, “The Testing o f  American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 77 
(Nov/Dec 1998): 56.
" David Fromkin, Kosova Crossing (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 87.
’’ John Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post- 
Com m unist Societies (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1998), 41.
 ^Thanos Veremis and D im itrios Triantaphyllou, e d s . , Kosova and the Albanian 
Dimension in the Southeastern Europe (Athens: Eliamep, 1999), 120.
'* “ Kosova: Rugova Asks for the Recognition o f  Independence, ” BBC, Albanian 
Service, 31 Decem ber 2001.
Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, Balancing in the Balkans (New York: St. 
M artin’s Press, 1999), 98.
"  U.S. Department o f  State, O ffice o f  the Spokesman, “M adeleine K. Albright: 
Speech to the Albanian Parliam ent,” 19 February 2000.
i: Joseph Fitchett, “Clinton Tilt on Kosova W orries Europeans, ” International Herald
Tribune, 1 October 1999, 7.
’ M isha Glenny, “Heading O ff  W ar in the Southern Balkans,” Foreign Affairs 74 
(M ay/June 1995): 106.
'■* “Statement to the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo July 30, 1999,” W eeklv 
Com pilation o f  Presidential Docum ents 35: 30 (2 August 1999), 1519-1520.
15 U.S. Department o f  State, O ffice o f  the Spokesman, “ Launch o f  Southeast Europe
Equity Fund,” 26 July 2000.
16 U.S. Department o f  State, O ffice o f  the Spokesman, “ U.S. Support for Southeast
European Stabilization,” 6 April 2000.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
' Paskal Milo, “ Kosova and Southeastern Europe After the C risis," Am erican Foreign 
Policv Interests 21, (O ctober 1999); 18.
“U.S. Firm Gets A lbanian C opper Deal," United Press International, 24 December
1999.
’** “Corridor 8- A  Vital Project for Balkan Cooperation," Koha Jone, 15 December
2000, 3.
Ibid.
■' “Balkan Ambo Pipeline to Start Raising Funds in July," .Albanian Dailv New s, 31 
M ay 2000.
■■ Gabriel Partosh, “On the Presence o f  Islamic M ilitants in the Balkans,” BBC, 
Albanian Service, 3 October 2001.
See Albanian Dailv N ew s, 7 D ecem ber 2000.
“Albania-Safe Haven for D rug Traffic,” Albanian Daily News, 4 M ay 2000.
"■ “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment o f  Troops to  Protect the U.S. 
Em bassy in Albania, August 18, 1998,” W eeklv Compilation o f  Presidential Documents
34:34 (24 August 1998), 1639.
■" See Andrew Higgins and C hristopher Cooper, “CIA: Berisha and Klosi Helped Us 
to Destroy the Al-Qaida Cell in A lbania," Koha Jone, 30 N ovem ber 2001.
*' “ Albania -  Free Skies for the A m ericans,” BBC, Albanian Service, 27 Septem ber 
20 0 1 .
“Albania Supports U.S. A ttacks in Afghanistan,” BBC, Albanian Service, 8 October
2 0 0 1 .
20 See Koha Jone, 5 D ecem ber 2001.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH APTER 5 
CONCLUSION
Albanian-Am erican relations have rarely been a major topic in the history o f 
international politics. This is understandable given the small territory and population o f  
Albania, as well as the extreme isolation o f  the country during the 45 years o f  communist 
rule. However, despite this lack o f  publicity, A lbanian-Am erican relations tend to be 
more com plex and intriguing than they appear on the surface, w hile at certain moments, 
they have assum ed an important ro le  for the interests o f  both parties and the development 
o f  international relations.
Historically, the United States is considered to be the m ain factor for the existence o f  
an independent Albanian state. W ilson’s insistence at the Paris Peace Conference for the 
preservation o f  the Albanian state w as a m ajor contribution that prevented the division o f  
A lbania’s territory am ong the neighboring countries, which all nourished expansionist 
am bitions towards the country. This single historic fact would determ ine the strongly pro- 
Am erican feelings and orientation o f  the Albanian population in the future. Throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s. the United S tates showed a particular interest in the fate o f  the tiny 
Albanian state, vying with the o ther neighboring countries, such as Italy and Yugoslavia, 
for influence in the country. It is believed that since that period, W ashington considered 
the existence o f  a strong Albanian state  in the Balkans as an ally  and a counter-balancing 
factor in view o f  the historic and ever-increasing ties o f  Serbia w ith Russia. This U.S.
91
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interest in Albania continued even after the establishment o f  the comm unist regime in 
Albania, when W ashington, in collaboration with London, tried to organize an internal 
insurgence to topple the comm unists. The failure o f  this attempt led to a period o f 
inactivity on the part o f  W ashington w ith Albania. A lbania’s split with the Soviet Union 
at the beginning o f  the 1960s was considered to be a strategic victory for the United 
States, because this prevented M oscow from an important foothold in the M editerranean, 
from where it could directly threaten the U.S. 6'^ fleet. After som e initial attem pts at 
rapprochement that followed the Albanian-Soviet rupture, W ashington abandoned any 
attempt to incorporate Albania in its new policy o f  détente with the com m unist block, 
som ething that, in retrospect, is considered to be a diplomatic mistake.
W ith the fall o f  communism in Eastern Europe and the establishment o f  pluralism  in 
Albania. Albanian-American relations took a new dimension. Since the beginning o f  the 
democratic processes in Albania in the early 1990s, one can distinguish a strong tilt in 
A lbania’s foreign policy toward the United States, which, on its part, began to show an 
increasing interest in Albania. O nce considered the most anti-American country in 
Europe during the Hoxha regime. A lbania becam e the most pro-American country on the 
old continent. In the early 1990s. as A lbania’s analyst Elez Biberaj puts it. "there was 
probably no country in Europe w here there was as m uch good will toward the United 
States as in Albania.” ' This was best reflected during Secretary o f  State Jam es Baker’s 
visit to A lbania in June 1991. when tens o f  thousands o f  Albanians turned out at T irana’s 
main square to give an unprecedented w elcom e to the American envoy.
It must be stressed that A lbania’s quest for close relations with the United States has a 
strategic character and is in keeping w ith the old tradition o f the country, w hich has
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constantly tried to find a big ally to serve as its protector from Great Powers' rivalries in 
the troubled region o f  the B alkans.' This has been the case with the Soviet Union, later 
with China and now with the United States. In fact, the military matters have been the 
most important aspects o f  the relations between the small Balkan country and the greatest 
power in the world. Considering an entrance to the European Union as a distant 
prospective. A lbania counts on the support o f  the United States for a possible joining o f 
NATO, an act that will greatly soothe its security concerns. On the other hand. Albania 
considers its close ties with W ashington, as well as American engagement and leadership 
in the Balkans, as o f  param ount importance for a favorable solution to the Kosova 
problem.
For the United States, the close links with A lbania tend to have a more conjectural 
and pragm atic nature. Thus, throughout the wars in Bosnia and Kosova, Albania played a 
key role in U.S. strategy toward the region, m aking its territory available as a support 
base for NA TO m ilitary missions. A lbania’s collaboration will be essential for American 
diplom acy in finding a viable solution for K osova and for maintaining stability in 
M acedonia. On the other hand, A lbania offers som e good investment opportunities for 
American com panies particularly in the oil and tourism  industry. The implementation o f  
the Stability Pact and the role o f  the port o f  D urres as the gateway o f  Corridor 8, a major 
network o f  comm unication through the Balkans that would link Asia with W estern 
Europe, would offer new chances for U.S. businesses in Albania.
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I. Factors Favorable to Increased 
Bilateral Relations
Keeping in mind the present situation in the Balkans and the new A m erican 
engagem ent in the region, bilateral relations between Albania and the U nited States will 
continue to increase in the future. There are a num ber o f  factors that favor th is  trend;
a. The Kosova Problem  and the Albanian Question 
in General
The Kosova problem is going to occupy the international community, especially  the 
United States, for a long time. We are ju s t at the beginning o f  the solution o f  this 
problem, which poses many unanswered questions and risks for the future. A s Amos 
Perlm utter, professor o f  political science at Am erican University points out, “ Kosova is 
the most intractable postwar conflict to da te .”  ^On the other hand, the K osova problem 
has raised for the first tim e at the beginning o f  this century the Albanian question  in 
general, whose solution is considered to be crucial for the future stability o f  the Balkans. 
M any analysts predict that a possible future independent Kosova, w hich is the most likely 
solution, w ill, at some point during this century, be jo ined with Albania, m aking  a reality 
the so-called “Greater Albania.” Such a possible scenario would dram atically  change the 
strategic balance in the Balkans, resulting in a new alignm ent o f forces in the region. This 
would directly influence the interests o f  the big powers, including the United States and 
Russia."* This is a major problem that is going to keep American diplom acy actively- 
engaged in the Balkans in general and in A lbanian politics in particular.
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b. The Pro-A m erican Orientation o f  the Albanian 
Population and Politics 
A s opposed to other Balkan countries such as Serbia and Greece, w here there exist 
strong anti-American feelings, in A lbania, the overwhelm ing m ajority o f  the population 
and the political parties are strongly in support o f  closer political, m ilitary , and economic 
ties w ith the United States. All the m ain political parties consider relations with the 
United States o f  strategic importance for Albania. In every major developm ent in U.S. 
foreign policy, as was the case with the  events o f  Septem ber 11. A lbanian political 
leaders and parties have stood strongly in support o f  U.S. actions. This is also manifested 
in the voting in the United Nations, w here, in 1996 and 1997, for exam ple, the Albanian 
delegation has cast, on average, the sam e vote as that o f  the Am erican delegation more 
than 70 % o f  the time, one o f  the highest percentages among the East European member 
countries.^
c. The G eo-Strategic Importance o f  
Albania and American Interests 
T he Albanian sea-cost is o f  strategic importance for the dom ination o f  the Balkans 
and M editerranean and the United States has already shown an interest in using military 
facilities in Albania. A possible Am erican naval base on the strategic island o f  Sazan will 
greatly  increase an American presence in Albania, while generating econom ic and 
political benefits for the country. This is a possible alternative for the Am ericans keeping 
in m ind the new global fight against terrorism  (which includes the Balkans) and the 
uncertain attitude o f  the Greek governm ent toward an American presence there, as well 
as the political instability in Turkey. D espite its small size, as the Balkan analyst M iranda
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Vickers points out. “A lbania matters much more to the international com m unity in the 
post com m unist era than it did previously.”*’
d. The Increasing Albanian Community 
in the United States
This is another im portant factor that influences the efforts to forge closer ties between 
the two countries. The Albanian com m unity in Am erica, although still not so large in 
numbers, is becom ing ever present and a major factor in influencing U.S. policy in the 
Balkans. This w as evident during N A TO ’s intervention in Kosova when there was a big 
show o f  support on the part o f  the Albanian com m unity in the United States for this 
interv ention, som ething that increased the sympathy o f  the Am erican population for the 
Kosovar cause. The A lbanian-Am erican Civic League, founded in 1989. the main 
organization o f  A lbanian immigrants in the United States, has been very influential with 
American politicians, and there is a caucus o f Albanian friends in the American 
Congress, which has strongly lobbied for a number o f  initiatives toward Albania and 
Kosova. Albania has been given a larger quota o f  im m igrants in the annual Diversity 
Visa Lottery in com parison with the other East-European countries.
e. The Dom inance o f  the Dollar and o f  the 
English Language in A lbania 
Unlike most o f  the East-European and Balkan countries where the German mark 
(now Euro) has been the main foreign currency and the G erm an language is taking 
precedence, in A lbania the dollar dom inates the currency exchange market and English is 
the first foreign language taught at schools. At the sam e time, the majority o f  young
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Albanians prefer to study and immigrate to the United States. Both these factors would 
have a positive influence for the strengthening o f  bilateral relations.
2. Factors Unfavorable to Increased 
Bilateral Relations
It must be stressed that parallel with the favorable factors m entioned above, there are 
a num ber o f  negative or unfavorable factors, w hich influence the future developm ents o f  
the bilateral relations.
a. Lack o f  Law and Order and Political Instability 
in Albania
The confrontational spirit o f  Albanian politics, the fragility o f  the democratic 
institutions and the weakness o f  government authority tend to dam age the foreign 
relations o f  A lbania w ith other countries, including the United States. Although 
W ashington has played a m ajor role in reducing the internal political tensions in Albania, 
the United States has repeatedly warned the Albanian authorities o f  negative 
consequences in bilateral relations if  the lack o f  law and order and the unabated political 
confrontations continue in the future. On the other hand, because o f  internal and 
external factors, A lbania will continue to remain for som e time on the list o f  countries 
posing a high risk for the foreign investors, including those from the United States.**
b. Sudden Shifts in Albanian Politics
Traditionally A lbania has tried to maintain close relations with a big power. This was 
the case in A lbania’s close relations with the Soviet Union and later with China. At the 
height o f  these relations, these countries were considered protectors o f  A lbania’s
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sovereignty. However, in both case we have w itnessed a radical turn in A lbanian politics 
when the closest friends have become the b iggest enem ies. A similar scenario can happen 
with the United States. A rem inder o f  these turns in Albanian politics can be illustrated 
with the stand o f  the Democratic Party, one o f  the tw o major parties in A lbania, and its 
leader Sali Berisha. This party was pro-A m erican since its formation at the end o f  1990 
and enjoyed the strong support o f  W ashington. Yet. later on. this party adopted a cool and 
even anti-Am erican stand. This happened w hen W ashington began to distance itse lf from 
the leader o f  the Dem ocratic Party, Sali Berisha, criticizing him for authoritarian and 
antidemocratic practices. At present, this party  again  is adopting a pro-A m erican stand. 
However, the presence o f  Berisha as the C hairm an o f  the party is considered to be a 
handicap for Albanian-Am erican relations.
c. The Contrasts in Political Priorities 
There exists a disproportion in the priorities o f  the foreign policy objectives o f  the 
two countries. W hile the United States has a g lobal policy and its relations w ith Albania 
are part o f  this policy, for Albania, relations w ith the United States is considered to be o f  
strategic importance. Another disadvantage is that A lbania, with its tiny population and 
territory, as well as its distance from the U nited States, represents a small and costly 
m arket for Am erican companies and products.
However, despite these disadvantages, as m entioned  above, there are a num ber o f  
com pelling factors that tend to give A lbanian-A m erican relations more im portance than 
might seem to m erit at first sight. As argued in th is study, the future o f  Kosova, the 
emergence o f  the Albanian question in general, and a potential destabilization o f  
M acedonia are all problem s which could pose real dangers for the stability o f  the
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Balkans. These situations will lead to a further intensification o f  Am erican-Albanian 
relations, providing a new challenge for the future o f  the whole region.
In conclusion, it can be said that Albania, because o f  its strategic position and its 
connections and influence in Kosova and M acedonia, as well as its strong pro-Am erican 
orientation, can represent a key player in Balkan politics and serve as a natural ally for 
the United States in supporting the A m erican strategy and interests in the area.
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